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Explanatory note to graduation work “THE METHOD OF FORMING CREW 
ACTIONS IN CASE OF FAILURE IN AVIONICS SYSTEMS”: 102 pages,  10 
figues, 3 tables, 12 references. 
     AVIATION ERGONOMICS, ALARMING DEVICE, FLIGHT SAFETY, 
FLIGHT SIMULATOR, PILOTING QUALITY EQUIPMENT, HUMAN 
FACTOR IN AVIATION, ACCIDENTS, EXERCISE MACHINE, FLIGHT 
ANALYSIS, PROCESS, PHENOMENA, FACTOR LOADING, CORRELATION 
FUNCTIONS, DYNAMIC STEREOTYPE, PHENOMENON OF 
AMPLIFICATION OF A DYNAMIC STEREOTYPE, TRAINING, 
DEVELOPMENT. 
     Object of study – display of avionics failures on the control panel and their 
impact on the pilot during the flight operation of the aircraft. 
The purpose of the graduation work – implementation of the methodological 
recommendation for pilots in case of systems failures.  
Method of research – the mark of the presence of phenomenon of amplification of 
dynamic stereotype, analysis of the law of distribution.  
Established, that necessary to determine the amplitude of change of angle of 
attack; analyzed oscillograms of real flights, construct a histogram of the 
distribution of the roll angle flight without failures after the 3rd turn. 
Thesis materials are recommended for using alarming system in case of training 
of pilots’ anti-stress program on simulators. 
Foreseeable assumptions about the development of the research object: 
increasing the quality of the flight operation, reliability and aviation safety in 
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The effectiveness of the use of aviation technology is inextricably linked to 
the question of flight safety. The successful solution of which problem largely 
determines the development prospects of both civil and military aviation. 
Complexity of solving the problem of ensuring flight safety is continuously 
increasing due to the increasing intensity of the use of aircraft and the expansion of 
the range of its functional tasks. Associated complication of the on-board 
equipment not only increases the probability of equipment failures, but also 
complicates the crew’s activities and causes additional piloting errors. 
This leads to an increase in the role of on-board means of automated control, 
diagnostics and control of on-board equipment, unloading and information support 
of the crew. One's ensuring the safety of the elements of the on-board ergatic 
complex "Crew - On-board Equipment - Aircraft" in the contour of the steering and 
automatic control of the aircraft. There are special on-board instrumentation 
support tools which ensure flight safety in possible emergency situations on the 
aircraft, in particular on airplanes. They are used by the crew: critical mode 
warning systems, failure monitoring and alarm systems, electronic display systems 
and other monitoring systems. 
Ones observe increase in the number of functional systems, units and other 
objects of on-board equipment of modern aviation technology. An increase in the 
number of critical flight parameters affect the level of piloting safety. Necessitate 
further automation of processes controlling the current state of the aircraft, on-
board equipment and crew actions, diagnosing failures, and forming control 
impacts and operational decisions at all stages from ground handling and preflight 
to preparation before landing under the general control of the crew. 
Modern passenger aircraft are largely automated, and this makes it easier 
pilot work, especially in difficult weather conditions and night. However, 
automation has a negative the side. In case of its refusal or the impossibility of 
using a ground, system providing the flight of the aircraft along the required 
trajectory for the landing approach has to be flown manually. 
 
 
And having got used to fly in automatic mode, the pilots lose their skills 
manual piloting, especially in difficult weather conditions. 
At all times the existence of aviation one of the main dangers for aircraft was 
stalling it in a corkscrew because loss of speed. So usually said before, but more 
correctly due to the increase in the angle of attack above its critical value. At such 
an angle of attack, smoothness is disturbed. Flow past the wing that is there is a 
stall on the top surface of the wing. At the same time sharply reduced lift. Because 
full symmetry of the flow usually does not happen then a breakdown occurs on any 
one wing. Therefore, the plane falls onto the wing on the one on which the failure 
occurred and turns into a spin. 
The angle of attack may increase to a critical value or when lost speed, or 
when increasing overload during maneuvering, and also when flying at high 
altitude near the ceiling of the aircraft, especially above thunder clouds. Where in at 
high altitude due to low instrument speed (i.e., small velocity head) it is also 
possible manifestation of instability aircraft angle of attack - a tendency to its 
spontaneous increase. 
In order to solve this problem, in this paper, recommendations for pilots in 
decision-making in unusual situations are considered. In the global situation it is 
proposed to carry out anti-stress training of pilots on training simulators with this 
method of focusing attention. This is required in order to gain additional insights in 









































CONSIDERATIONS FOR A HUMAN FACTORS ANALYSIS 
 
 1.1. Introduction to human factor 
Human factor is a scientific field that is based on the interaction between 
people, technologies and organizations. It focuses on safe and effective goods or 
services production. Human factor embraces many different disciplines such as 
psychology, technology and engineering science, sociology, organizational theory 
and management. The human factor can cover everything from fundamental 
ergonomic issues around the design of systems and methods, to complex 
associations between managers expressing their goals and how this affects the day-
to-day work of an organization.  
The purpose of human factors research is to try to understand why it makes 
sense for people to do what they did. As the background is taken their physical and 
psychological work medium. In a result of human factors analysis, the data about 
people behavior have been received. But the main problem in it that it did never 
allows to entirely close the gap to why they did it. The data cannot give a full 
explanation of a human factor analysis. Human factor can often be seen as vague, 
speculative, or as merely a matter of opinion, and not in great need of the same 
level of expertise as a technical part of an investigation. 
The better way for the human factors analysis of the accident investigation is 
to find as many as possible details and insights, the eventual reasons for why the 
pilots did what they did. The understanding of causes holds an important key to the 
accident reasons solving and it moves to improve recommendations for a flight 
crew. The performance of pilots in extreme situation is evidently critical for the 
















 The results of a human factors analysis may remain infinitely negotiable and 
never entirely certain. In other words, other people can always draw different 
conclusions about a person's capabilities based on the proposed data. This does not 
mean that some explanations are no more plausible than others. Some explanations 
take into account more data, or account for data better and with a greater level of 
detail, or make better use of the theoretical, methodological and research 
foundations of modern human factor work.  
 
1.2. The human factor analysis and classification system (HFACS) 
In order to work on correcting and improving human factors problems, it is 
necessary to delve into the true root causes of events. For this, the basis was taken 
Reason’s (1990) concept of latent and active failures. HFACS describes four levels 
of failure: 1) Unsafe Acts, 2) Preconditions for Unsafe Acts, 3) Unsafe Supervision, 
and 4) Organizational Influences. A brief description of the major components and 
causal categories follows, beginning with the level most closely tied to the 
accident, i.e., unsafe acts. 
 
 1.2.1. The concept of Unsafe Acts  
Unsafe actions of the crew can be roughly divided into two categories: errors 
and violations. In general, errors are mental or physical activities of people who 
cannot achieve the desired result. Unsurprisingly, given the fact that humans make 
errors by their very nature, these unsafe practices dominate most accident 
databases. On the other hand, violations refer to the willful disregard of rules and 
regulations governing flight safety. Unfortunately, predicting and preventing these 
terrible and totally “preventable” unsafe practices continues to elude policymakers 
and researchers. Distinguishing between errors and violations does not provide the 
level of detail required for most aircraft accident investigations. Therefore, the 
categories of errors and violations were expanded on Figure 1, and include three 
basic error types (skill-based, decision, and perceptual) and two forms of violations 




Figure 1. Categories of unsafe acts committed by aircrews 
 
1.2.2. Human error in aviation 
Human error has been documented as the leading cause of over 70 percent of 
commercial aircraft hull damage accidents. Although human factor is usually 
associated with flight operations, it has also become a major problem in 
maintenance and air traffic management practices in recent years. Human factors 
professionals work with engineers, pilots and mechanics to apply the latest 
knowledge of the interaction between human performance and commercial aircraft 
to help operators improve the safety and efficiency of their day-to-day operations.  
The term “human factor” is becoming more and more popular as the 
commercial industry realizes that human factors, not mechanical failure, are at the 
root of most accidents and incidents. Human factors are often considered 
synonymous with Crew Resource Management (CRM) or Maintenance Resource 
Management (MRM). However, it is much broader in both its knowledge base and 
scope. Human factor includes collecting information about human capabilities, 
limitations and other characteristics and applying it to tools, machines, systems, 
tasks, workplaces and the environment to ensure safe, comfortable and effective 
human use. In aviation, the human factor seeks to better understand how people can 
most safely and effectively integrate with technology.  
Despite the rapid development of technology, people have full responsibility 
for ensuring the success and safety of the aviation industry. They need to remain 
knowledgeable, flexible, goal-oriented and effective with common sense. In the 
 
 
meantime, the industry continues to invest heavily in training, equipment and 
systems that have long-term implications. The use of technology continues to 
advance faster than the ability to predict how people will interact with it. Instead, a 
solid scientific basis is needed to assess human performance in design, training and 
procedures, just as developing a new wing requires robust aerodynamic 
engineering.    Improving human performance can help reduce accidents in 
commercial aviation, with a focus on designing human-aircraft interactions and 
developing procedures for flight crews and technicians alike. It is necessary to use 
the capabilities of a person in an aircraft to improve usability, maintainability, 
reliability and comfort. In addition, human factors specialists are involved in 
analytical security and the development of methods and techniques to help 
operators manage human error. These responsibilities require close cooperation 
from professionals, safety experts, test pilots and training pilots, mechanics and 
flight attendants to properly integrate the human element into the design of all 
aircraft. Their area of responsibility includes taking into account the human factor 
in the design of the flight crew compartment, design of maintainability and support 
during operation. 
 
1.2.3.  Error management  
Over the past several decades, safer and more reliable designs have led to 
significant progress in reducing accidents and improving efficiency. Improvements 
in engines, systems and designs have contributed to this achievement. In addition, 
design has always been considered a factor in preventing and mitigating human 
error. Analytical methods, such as layout or simulator evaluation, are used to assess 
how well different design solutions meet these requirements. At the heart of these 
efforts is a human-centered design philosophy backed by millions of flights and 
decades of experience. This approach allows you to create a project in which the 
technology best meets the confirmed requirements: 
 Customer input. 
 Appropriate degree of automation. 
 Crew interaction capability. 
 
 
 Communication, Navigation and Surveillance/Air Traffic Management 
improvements. 
The cockpit should be designed to provide automation to assist, but not 
replace. The flight crew member responsible for the safe operation of the aircraft. 
Flight crew errors usually occur when the crew cannot see the problem and cannot 
correct the error in time to prevent the situation from getting worse. Hence, 
cockpits include intuitive and easy-to-use systems. These systems support 
instrument displays with visual and tactile motion cues to minimize potential 
confusion about which functions are automated. Visual and tactile cues for 
movement are provided by reverse controls. These controls enhance situational 
awareness and help keep the flight crew fully informed of changes in aircraft status 
and flight path during all phases of automatic and manual flight.  
 
1.2.4. Decision errors 
Decision errors are deliberate behavior that happens as intended, but the plan 
is inadequate or inappropriate for the situation. These unsafe actions, often referred 
to as “honest mistakes,” are actions or inactions of people that they either did not 
have the appropriate knowledge or were simply wrongly chosen. 
 Decision errors, perhaps the most studied of all forms of error, can be 
divided into three main categories: procedural errors, wrong choices, and problem-
solving errors represented in Table 1. 
Procedural or rule-based errors occur during highly structured tasks of this 
kind. In almost all phases of flight, very clear procedures must be followed. 
However, errors can and often do when a situation is either not recognized or 
misdiagnosed and the wrong procedure is applied. This is especially true when 
pilots are caught in a time critical emergency such as an engine malfunction during 
takeoff. 
Visual illusions, for example, arise when the brain tries to “fill in the gaps” 
with what it thinks belongs to a visually poor environment, as it does at night or 
when flying in bad weather. Likewise, spatial disorientation occurs when the 
vestibular system cannot determine a person's orientation in space and therefore 
 
 
makes a “best guess” — usually when visual (horizontal) cues are absent at night or 
when flying in adverse weather. In any case, the unsuspecting person is often left to 
make a decision based on false information, and the likelihood of making a mistake 
increases. However, it is important to note that it is not an illusion or disorientation 
that is classified as a perceptual error. Rather, it is the pilot's mistaken reaction to 
illusion or disorientation. For example, many unsuspecting pilots have experienced 
approaching a "black hole" only to launch a perfectly good plane into terrain or 
water. This continues to happen even though it is well known that flying over dark, 
featureless terrain at night (such as a lake or a field devoid of trees) creates the 
illusion that the plane is actually taller than it is. As a result, pilots are taught to rely 
on their core instruments rather than the outside world, especially during the 
approach phase. 
However, some pilots are unable to control their instruments while flying at 
night. Unfortunately, these and other crews, deceived by illusions and other 
disorienting flight modes, can end up in a fatal plane crash. 
It is possible that unsafe actions by pilots can be directly linked to nearly 
80% of all accidents. However, simply focusing on unsafe activities is impractical 
without understanding the root cause. For a deeper understanding, Figure 2 presents 
two main subdivisions of unsafe conditions for crews - subnormal operating 
conditions for operators and substandard practices that they undertake. 
 






1.2.5. Skill-based errors  
Skill-based behavior within the context of aviation is best described as 
“stick-andrudder” and other basic flight skills that occur without significant 
conscious thought. As a result, these skill-based actions are particularly vulnerable 
to failures of attention and/or memory. Skill-based behavior usually occurs without 
serious, conscious thought. As a result, these skill-based activities are particularly 
vulnerable to attention and / or memory failures. In fact, attention deficits have 
been associated with many skill-related errors, such as violation of visual scan 
patterns, task fixation, inadvertent activation of controls, and incorrect sequence of 
steps in a procedure, among others, in Table 1. Unlike attention deficits, memory 
impairments often show up as missing checklists, lost space, or forgotten 
intentions. It is not hard to imagine that under stress conditions during in-flight 
emergencies, important steps in emergency procedures can be overlooked. 
However, even when they are not under a lot of stress, people forget to close the 
approach or lower the landing gear - at least an annoying oversight. 
 
1.2.6. Technique errors 
Skill errors found in many accident investigations are due to technical errors. 
Regardless of training, experience, and education, the way a particular sequence of 
events is carried out can vary greatly. That is, two pilots with the same training, 
flight class and experience can differ significantly in the manner of maneuvering 
their aircraft. While one pilot can fly smoothly, others can fly with abrupt 
transitions. However, while both can be safe and equally adept in flight, the 
techniques they use can tune them into specific failure modes. In fact, such 
techniques are not only a factor in innate abilities, but also a clear expression of 
one's own personality, which at best makes it difficult to prevent and eliminate 
technical errors. 
 
Table 1. Selected examples of Unsafe Acts of Pilot Operators 
 
 
No ERRORS VIOLATIONS 
1 Skill-based Errors Failed to adhere to brief 
   
2 Breakdown in visual scan Failed to use the radar 
altimeter 
3 Failed to prioritize attention Flew an unauthorized 
approach 
4 Inadvertent use of flight 
controls 
Violated training rules 
5 Omitted step in procedure Flew an overaggressive 
maneuver 
6 Omitted checklist item Failed to properly prepare 
for the flight 
7 Poor technique Briefed unauthorized 
flight 
8 Over-controlled the aircraft Not current/qualified for 
the mission 
9 Decision Errors Intentionally exceeded the 
limits of the aircraft 
10 Improper procedure Continued low-altitude 
flight in VMC 
11 Misdiagnosed emergency Unauthorized low-altitude 
canyon running 
12 Visual illusion  
13 Wrong response to 
emergency 
 
14 Exceeded ability  
15 Inappropriate maneuver  
 
1.2.7. Failure conditions 
 
 
They are defined as the impact on the aircraft and its occupants, both direct 
and indirect, caused by one or more failures, taking into account the associated 
adverse operating conditions or the environment. Failure conditions can be 
classified according to their severity as follows: 
1) Minor. Failure conditions that cannot significantly reduce the safety of the 
aircraft and involve crew actions that are within their capabilities. 
2) Major. Failure conditions that would reduce the aircraft's ability or the 
crew's ability to cope with adverse operating conditions to such an extent that it 
would, for example, result in a significant reduction in safety margin or 
functionality, a significant increase in crew workload, or conditions that reduce 
crew efficiency, or causing discomfort to passengers, possibly including injury. 
3) Hazardous. Failure conditions that would reduce the aircraft's ability or 
the crew's ability to cope with adverse operating conditions to such an extent that: 
-Significantly reduced safety margin or functionality 
- A physical disaster or higher workload in which the flight crew cannot be 
relied upon to complete their tasks accurately or completely, or 
- Serious or fatal injuries to a relatively small number of passengers. 
4) Catastrophic. Refusal conditions that will prevent safe flight and landing. 
Each of the above probabilities has a maximum value assigned, which 
depends on the type of aircraft considered—for example, for large aircraft, 
extremely improbable is 10
−9









Figure 3. Relationship between probability and severity of failure conditions. 
 
We can gain a better indication of the safety levels relating to the above 
figures through another example. A single aircraft might fly a total of 5 × 10
4
 hours 
and a large fleet of 200 aircraft (same type) might then accumulate a fleet total of 
10
7
 hours.  
1) A catastrophic failure condition (at worst 10
−9
) would be unlikely to arise 
in the whole fleet’s life. 
2) A hazardous failure condition (at worst 10
−7
) might arise once in the 
whole fleet’s life. 
3) A major failure condition (at worst 10
−5
) might arise once in an aircraft’s 
life and would arise several times in the whole fleet’s life. 
4) A minor failure could arise several times in the aircraft’s life. 
The safety assessment of equipment, systems, and installation is a very 
important (and fascinating) part of aircraft design. It is of paramount importance to 
start the assessment from the very beginning of the design. A late assessment could 
bring unpleasant surprises, leading to expensive design changes. 
As mentioned before, the techniques of safety assessment are a specialist 
matter. [2] 
 
1.3. Pitot-Static System 
The pressure source for the airspeed indicator, vertical speed indicator (VSI) 
and altimeter is the static pitot system. The main components of the static pitot 
system are the shock pressure chamber and lines, and the static pressure chamber 
and lines, each of which may be completely or partially blocked by ice, dirt and/or 
other foreign objects. A blockage of the pitot-static system will adversely affect the 
performance of the instrument shown in Figure 4. 
Partial static blocking of the system is insidious in the sense that it can go 
unnoticed until the critical phase of flight. During takeoff, climb and leveling at 
cruising altitude, the altimeter, airspeed indicator and vertical orientation may work 
normally. There can be no signs of malfunction until the plane starts descending. 
 
 
If the static reference system is severely constrained but not completely 
blocked when the aircraft descends, the static reference pressure on the gauges 
begins to lag behind the actual outside air pressure. During descent, the altimeter 
may indicate that higher than actual airflow from the static port to the altimeter is 
obstructing. The VSI validates the rate of change information of the altimeter 
because the reference pressure does not change at the same rate as the outside air 
pressure. 
Airspeed indicator can not determine whether it is experiencing a greater 
pressure pitot or minimal static pressure reference, but indicates a higher air 
velocity than actual. To the pilot, the instruments indicate that the plane is too high, 
too fast, and descending at a much slower speed than would be desired. If the pilot 
levels off and then begins to climb, the altitude indication may still lag behind. The 
VSI shows that the aircraft is not climbing as fast as it actually is. 
However, the indicated airspeed may begin to decrease at an alarming rate. 
The smallest pitch tilt can cause the airspeed needle to show dangerously close to 
stall speed. Managing static system failure requires the pilots know and understand 
the aircraft's pitot-static system. If a system malfunction is suspected, the pilot 
should confirm this by opening an alternate source of static electricity. This should 
be done during a climb or descent. If the needles of the instruments move while 
doing this, there is a static pressure problem. Failure of the pitot-statics system can 
also have serious consequences for electronic aircraft systems (EFIS).  
Fault indications of conventional instruments and electronic flight indicators 
may be completely different, and indications of faults in electronic systems are not 
standardized. Due to the wide variety of glass cab system designs, the primary 
display and the backup display can react differently to any data entry interruption, 
and both displays can operate differently than conventional instruments under the 
same conditions. It is imperative that pilots receive equipment-specific information, 
both aircraft and avionics, that fully prepares them to interpret and properly 
respond to faults in electronic flight instrument display equipment. Rapidly 
changing equipment, complex systems, and the complexity or inability to model 
failure modes and functions can impose learning constraints. Pilots must still be 
 
 
able to respond in a timely manner to equipment failures without disrupting other 
mission-critical flight missions. 
 
Figure 4. Effect of blocked pitot-static sources. 
 
Pilots and flight instructors should refer to FAA-H-8083-15 for instructions 
on how to perform these tasks and to the relevant PTS (Practice Test Standards) for 
information on the standards by which these required tasks must be performed for a 
given certification level and/or rating. However, the pilot must remember that if 
these tasks are not performed on a consistent and regular basis, skill erosion will 
begin almost immediately. In a very short time, the pilot's expected confidence 
level is much higher than the performance that he or she can actually demonstrate 
when needed. Accident statistics show that a pilot who has not been trained in 
instrument flight, or a pilot whose instrument skills have deteriorated, will lose 
control of the aircraft approximately 10 minutes after having to rely solely on 
instrument data. 
The purpose of this section is to provide limited time control of the aircraft 
when a VFR pilot encounters Instrumental Meteorological Conditions (IMC). The 
main goal is not accurate instrument flight; rather, it helps the VFR pilot to keep the 
aircraft under adequate control until suitable visual references are restored. 
 
 
The first steps required to survive a VFR collision with an IMC pilot are as 
follows: 
• Acknowledging and accepting the seriousness of the situation and the need 
for immediate remedial action. 
• Maintaining control over the aircraft 
• Obtaining appropriate assistance in landing aircraft safely on the ground. 
Many hours of VFR flight, using the artificial horizon as a guide to control 
the aircraft, can lull the pilot into a false sense of safety based on overestimating his 
or her personal ability to fly an aircraft solely by instruments. In VFR conditions, 
even if the pilot thinks he is controlling the aircraft with the instrument, the pilot 
also gets an overview of the natural horizon and may subconsciously rely on it 
more than the orientation indicator. If the natural horizon suddenly disappears, the 
untrained instrument pilot will be subject to dizziness, spatial disorientation, and an 
inevitable loss of control. 
 
1.3.1. Failure emergence in Pitot-static system  
Erroneous airspeed and altitude readings caused by pitot anomalies and the 
static system can be misleading for the untrained flight crew. Failure of the crew to 
respond correctly can lead to an accident or incident. 
Good flight reference charts are important for diagnostics, and the following 
table can provide useful data: 
Table 2. Failure influence on Indicated airspeed and Indicated attitude 
     Failure        Indicated airspeed       Indicated attitude 
Pitot source blocked. Increased with alt gain. 
Decreases with alt loss. 
Unaffected. 
Once static port blocked. Inaccurate during 
sideslipping. 
Very sensitive in 
turbulence. 
 
Both static sources Decreases with alt gain. Does not change with 
 
 
blocked. Increases with alt loss. actual gain or loss of 
altitude. 
Both static and pitot 
sources blocked. 
All indications remain 
constant, regardless of 
actual changes in 
airspeed or altitude. 
 
 
During pitot-static failures, typical reliable information includes: 
•Pitch and role indicators 
•Engine thrust indication 
•Radio Altitude 
•Basic GPWS (EGPWS/terrain avoidance warning system may not) 
•Stick Shaker 
•Ground Speed (uses inertial information) 
•Airplane position (uses inertial information). 











Always remember that basic airmanship is vital: 
• Fast recognition is very important - the longer deviation from the intended 
flight path, the more difficult it will be recovering. 
• Find or maintain favorable flight conditions - Find visual cues (e.g., 
daylight, climb above the clouds). 
 
 
• Train for unusual failure conditions to:  
• Recognize unusual or suspicious signs (e.g., cross-checking instruments, 
maintaining standard conventions, etc.); 
• Maintain a safe flight first (i.e., fly with basic pitch and power settings), 
and only then carry out diagnostics (or troubleshoot); 
• Make a precautionary mistake (e.g., gentle incline, speeding, etc.); 
• Distinguish between true/false information. 
 
1.4. Divergence of crew mental model of system state  
Divergence is defined as a discrepancy between the mental model of the state 
of the human operator's system and the actual state of the system, significant 
enough to have consequences for the outcome of the situation. In commercial 
aircraft, pilots use both continuous modern parameters, such as airspeed and 
altitude, and discrete parameters, such as autopilot (A/P), to mentally model the 
system and fly the aircraft. Provided that the control of the aircraft includes control 
of continuous parameters as well as discrete parameters, the flight can be described 
as a hybrid control problem (Branicki, Borkar and Mitter 1998). The corresponding 
crew parameters are adapted depending on the aircraft configuration as well as the 
flight situation. Figure 5 shows one example of possible discrepancies in the crew's 
mental model. At the moment  
t = t0, the state of the system and the mental model are consistent. 
Between the time t = t0 and t = t1, both the state of the system and the mental 
model pass into state II and remain consistent. The discrepancy occurs at time t = 
t2, when the environment goes back to State I, but the crew believes that the system 
remains in State II. Figure 1 is an example of one classification (type D-1) of 
divergence in which the actual transitions between states and the mental model of 
the crew are not updated to reflect the transition. Divergence types are defined 
below. 
• Type D-1: Actual state transitions and crew mental model are not updated 
to reflect the transition. 
• Type D-1a: actual transitions between states without crew intervention. 
 
 
• Type D-1b: actual transitions between states due to upstream crew actions. 
• Type D-2: The actual state does not change, however the mental model of 
the crew suggests a change in the state of the system. 
• Type D-3: Actual state transitions and the crew's mental model is updated to 
reflect the other transition.
 
Figure 5. Schematic of possible divergence between actual system state and crew 
mental model 
 
1.4.1. Development of Model of Divergence 
The model was developed based on the concept of mental model divergence. 
This new model provides a framework for understanding these discrepancies and 
communicating mitigation. Figure 6 depicts the developed model and expands on 
previous work to include direct comparisons between the state of the system and a 
working mental model. The framework developed includes situational awareness 
processes, decision-making processes and execution processes, constantly 
interacting with a working mental model. The working mental model and its 
interaction with situational awareness are especially important given the potential 
positive and negative consequences for decision making and execution (Endsley, 
1999; Histon & Hansman, 2008). Provided that the working mental model is the 
“engine” for simulating the outcome of possible actions, the mental model needs to 
have access to the perceived state of the environment (Rouse & Morris, 1985). 
Thus, the integrity of perception and experience included in the mental model must 




 • Perception of the environment usually occurs directly or through 
intermediaries such as displays or instruments. 
• Experience also feeds the mental model, creating a framework on which 
understanding is possible.  
 
Figure 6. Novel model of divergence between crew mental model and actual 
system state 
It develops on the basis of the pilot's previous flying experience, including 
flight and ground training. It is this framework that allows pilots to construct 
meaningful patterns/understanding of perceived information input from the 
environment. This affects both the phase of understanding the situation and the 
phase of projection, since a certain dynamics of the situation is expected. 
Awareness of the situation - perception, understanding and projection - of the 
environment influences pilot decision-making and execution processes (Endsley, 
1999). From a repository of decisions built up from prior experience, the pilot 
selects a possible solution and feeds it into a working mental model to “model” the 
outcome of this action. This process is repeated until a solution is selected and used 
in the execution processes. Previous experience of executing decisions is 
transferred through the working mental model to the execution processes. The 
 
 
result of the execution directly affects the actual state of the system, and this 
change is then perceived by the pilot, completing the feedback loop. This 
interaction occurs constantly when the pilot interacts with the environment 
(Endsley, 1995; Histon & Hansman, 2008). Using this framework of the cognitive 
process, it becomes possible to use the model to assess cases and sources of 
discrepancy by comparing the mental model and the actual state of the system. 
As seen in Figure 6, two comparisons arise. An error in the current and / or 
future state is the occurrence of a discrepancy. 
• The error in the mental model of the current state is determined by 
comparing the instantaneous state of the system and understanding the current state 
of the system in the working mental model. 
• The error in the mental model of the dynamics of the future state is 
determined by comparing the trajectory of the state of the system and the projection 
of the future state of the system in the working mental model. The model can also 
be used to assess sources of discrepancy. According to this scheme, failures in 
perception, understanding and projection will affect the integrity of a working 
mental model. In addition, more complex interactions, such as expectation bias, can 
affect the cognitive process, manifesting itself as a glitch in perception or perhaps 
in projection if steps in the cognitive process have been skipped. To test the 
occurrence of the discrepancy, as well as the causes and cognitive impairment 
leading to the discrepancy, an analysis was performed on a subset of automation 
accidents. 
 
1.4.2. Breakdowns in perception 
Perceptual glitches usually include a lack of detection of the automatic 
throttle control mode. The analysis did not distinguish between whether the crew 
scanned and misread the information, or whether they scanned the relevant 
information. Thus, perceptual glitches refer to cases where effective perception has 
not been achieved, the cause of which may include a number of different sources. 
Of the accidents,  
 
 
75% showed signs of impaired perception, and three different sources were 
observed in the analysis of the incidents: 
• Insufficient feedback: there was evidence based on crew behavior that the 
crew was not receiving the signal. In these cases, crew feedback (if any) was 
ineffective in getting their attention. A possible mitigation to improve the lack of 
feedback would be to increase signal signature. The importance of the correct 
signal can be, for example, in the form of an automation message or a low-speed 
signal. Given that visual indicators already exist for both of these messages, it may 
be worthwhile to improve the visual indicators or add an audio or tactile component 
to the messages. 
• Expectation bias: There was evidence that the crew were holding on to an 
assumption that may have biased their perception of the incoming information, 
which may conflict with the current assumption, also called confirmation bias. 
Waiting bias is a cycle in which the erroneous expectation of a future state affects 
the perception of incoming information. Reducing expectations bias should break 
this cycle. Cognitive Reboot is a response to cognitive tunneling, or anticipation 
bias, that pilots may encounter in stressful situations. 
• Attentional Limitations: There was evidence of other actions or signals that 
distracted the crew's attention during the divergence. This could include individual 
resource constraints, additional workload or distraction due to an unstabilized 
approach, or a non-standard approach that could increase the workload. 
Countermeasures for attention restrictions may include adhering to standard 
procedures or ensuring maximum nominal operations, for example, when crews are 
denied visual approach clearances. 
In addition to training, cognitive reloading can be accomplished through 
procedures such as automation or speed cross-checks during flight or approach. 
Failures in understanding and projection. Failures in understanding and prediction 
were identified by specific comments or actions by the crew that indicated a 
misunderstanding. All accidents analyzed showed failures in understanding/ 




• Interference: There is evidence of a separate signal that has been confused 
with a signal of interest. In these cases, perception may have remained intact, but 
misapplication of experience may cause impairment of understanding. Mitigation 
for countering interference can be training teams to cross-check several different 
sources of information to validate the signal. 
• Feedback ambiguity: There were at least two different likely reasons for the 
signal feedback. In these cases, it is possible that the perception remained intact, 
however, if a misinterpretation of the signal was applied at the stage of 
understanding, the projection will also be broken. To counteract the ambiguity of 
the feedback, designers can include specific feedback for signals that have different 
meanings to the flight crew. 
• Lack of experience: There was evidence of insufficient crew understanding 
of the consequences of certain system (or automation) conditions, such as FLCH or 
A/P shutdown. It can be argued that understanding the consequences of the 
conditions relies on correct projection. Thus, at this level, it is impossible to 
distinguish between understanding and projection. 
• Misapplication of experience in abnormal situations: there was evidence 
that the situation involved abnormal procedures that could be confused with normal 
counterparts. In these cases, it is possible that nominal experience instead of 
abnormal experience is applied to understanding, causing a denial of 
understanding. Mitigation for these types of failures could take the form of 
procedures that force nominal procedures, such as standardized approach criteria or 
the use of ILS in visual environments. Crew training may also include further 
familiarity with unusual situations. [3] 
 
CONCLUSION 
In aviation, human factor is dedicated to better understanding how humans 
can most safely and efficiently be integrated with the technology. That 
understanding is then translated into design, training, policies, or procedures to help 
humans perform better. The main goal of human factors specialists is to promote 
 
 
safety in the aviation field working to reduce the occurrence and impact of human 
error in aviation systems and improve human performance.  
Among operator unsafe acts distinguish errors and violations. 
The structure of HFACS and the information obtained from the analysis of 
the database have been used to develop innovative accident investigation methods 
that have improved both the quantity and quality of human factors information 
collected during accident investigation. However, safety professionals are not only 
better suited to studying human error in the field, but with the help of HFACS, they 
can now track those areas that are responsible for accidents.  
Also, a static pitot system was taken as an example. The main errors that can 
occur during the flight and the impact on IAS, IA and IVS. Recommendations for 
the crew were identified to eliminate errors. 
It was regarded the model based on the concept of mental model divergence. 
This new model provides a framework for understanding these discrepancies and 
communicating mitigation. Awareness of the situation - perception, understanding 
and projection - of the environment influences pilot decision-making and execution 
processes. So, the crew should be training both A/P and manual airplane control to 
decrease divergence in mental cognition of pilots and state of the system.  
Improving human performance can help the industry reduce the commercial 
aviation accident rate, much of the focus is on designing human-airplane interfaces 
and developing procedures for both flight crews and maintenance 
technicians. Also, better understanding of human factor leads to improve usability, 
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 CHAPTER 2 
CONCEPTS OF FLIGHT CONTROLING AND PRINCIPLES OF 
CREW TRAINING ON FLIGHT SIMULATOR 
 
2.1. Concept of dynamic stereotype of the flight crew and the 
phenomenon of its amplification 
A stable system of conditioned neural connections in the cerebral cortex, 
interconnected and manifested as a result of a single trigger signal, is called a 
dynamic stereotype. 
A dynamic stereotype is an integral system of conventional conditioned 
reflex reactions. It corresponds to the signal, ordinal and temporal characteristics of 
the stimulus. The concept was presented by I.P. Pavlova in 1932. The neural 
processes underlying the formation of a dynamic stereotype are combined because 
the current reflex response becomes a signal for the next response and is supported 
by it. With the strengthening of the stereotype, this sequence of nervous processes 
is fixed. All reactions can be reproduced with the preservation of sign, intensity and 
sequence, even if only one of the stimuli is presented. 
Multiple repetition of the system of stimuli with the simultaneous flow of 
processes in the central nervous system leads to the fact that they are fixed in the 
internal stereotype. 












2.1.2. Influence of the overlays factor on the crew 
The influence of factor loadings (FL) in some operators is manifested in the 
strengthening of the dynamic stereotype (DS). It consists in an increase in the 
amplitude of control movements while maintaining their general structure. 
Operational actions become meaningless, traumatized operations are 
performed, which sometimes end in confusion or wrong actions, and wrong 
decisions are made. 
Experimental data confirming the phenomenon of stereotype amplification 
and "flying handwriting" under complex refusals. 
During the flight, pilots do not always manage to avoid false actions. 
Moreover, as the static data collected on the flight simulaor show, the duration of 
incorrect aircraft piloting increases with an increase in the number of simultaneous 
factors (in this case, failures). 
The most common mistakes in technique: non-observance of the glide path 
and non-observance of speed on the glide path, approaching the course on a turn, 
non-observance of the course, correction in the wrong direction, non-observance of 
the vertical speed. 
Moreover, after the pilot begins to correct the error, the dynamic stereotype 
is amplified in amplitude and frequency, which is recorded using flight registration. 
In existing literary sources, there is a diametrically opposite idea, when the actions 
of factor loads are not amplification, but the so-called "destruction" of the dynamic 
stereotype of action. Experiments on flight simulator and statistics do not confirm 








this. A particularly good discrepancy can be seen on the oscillograms for the roll 
angle parameter. Verification of this position is important for the development of 
new training programs, as well as for issuing practical recommendations to the pilot 
to improve his piloting skills. 
The pilot begins to rotate the plane around the required parameter, indicating 
that the pilot is in the zone of reflected motion, that is, we see the muscular 
(qualitative) or temporal (quantitative) sweep of the pilot, which starts with spatial, 
is obtained from visual and purely tactical receptors. Moreover, visual sensations 
are objective, and muscle ones are subjective. 
Erroneous and allogical actions during the flight are associated, first of all, 
with changes in the mental processes of spatial signals from the action of factor 
loads. Having received spatial signals from the action of factorial loads with a 
sufficient number of them, the pilot can get into the zone of reflected motion, but 
spatial. Failure to actively counteract factor loading can lead to improper actions by 
onboard engineers (interconnection of levers, toggle switches, buttons, etc.).  
An important element of crew training is this kind of delay that can serve as 
the logic of flight training. This serves as an important basis for his training, as well 
as the choice of the only correct solution to counter unexpected stimulus. 
 
2.2. Loss of control (LOC) 
In many pilot error accidents, flight crews had inconsistent assumptions 
about the actual state of the system when responding to a failure or abnormal 
situation. The rapid increase in loss of control in general aviation in recent years is 
a cause for concern. Loss of control refers to a unique characteristic in which 
external and internal events act in concert. 
Aircraft accidents are recognized as the most tragic of all modes of transport 
due to their serious nature and the high number of injuries and deaths. However, the 
increase in air travel over recent decades reflects consumer acceptance of air travel 
as the safest and fastest mode of transport. An aviation accident can occur at any 
time due to various factors: aircraft types, combat crew skills and experience, 
environmental changes, etc. A fight is categorized according to its purpose (e.g. 
 
 
commercial, private or military) and operations (farming, sightseeing, grazing, 
ambulance/ambulance (EMS) and border surveillance). 
Various aviation communities have worked to improve safety parameters, 
categorizing combat phases as take-offs, landings, traffic patterns, stalls, altitude 
recovery, and controlled terrain combat. 
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) established the Joint General 
Aviation Steering Committee (GAJSC) to investigate and provide suggestions and 
recommendations for reducing the accident rate. 
Te GAJSC has determined that Loss of Control Accidents (LOCs) are usually 
due to poor combat team practice and account for 70% of fatalities. 
The Joint Safety Analysis Group (JSAT) defined LOC as “a significant, 
unintentional departure of an aircraft from controlled flight, operational range or 
conventional combat, including ground events. The term "significant" refers to an 
event that leads to an accident or incident. This definition excluded catastrophic 
explosions, runway collision, total loss of thrust without loss of control, and any 
other incident scenarios in which the crew remained in control. This does include 
loss of control due to aircraft structure, aircraft malfunction, human actions and 
other such events. 
We have determined that the most significant events that contribute to 
maneuvering accidents are obstacles, tedious operations, inadequate situational 
guidance, and poorly visible terrain. These events have a catalytic effect, triggering 
other events, especially when fighting at low altitude. Without considering these 
parameters, it is difficult to cope with the loss of control during the maneuvering 
phase. The risk mitigation approach has shown that the current procedural methods 
are good enough to withstand the specific risks associated with the crew and 
equipment. This reflects the need to improve the level of crew training in order to 
avoid disability and distraction. [4] 
 
2.3. Maintaining airplane control 
Once the pilot understands and accepts the situation, he or she must 
understand that the only way to safely operate the aircraft is to use and trust the 
 
 
flight instruments. Attempts to partially control the aircraft using flight instruments 
while searching outside the aircraft to visually confirm the information provided by 
these instruments lead to inadequate aircraft control. This can be followed by 
spatial disorientation and complete loss of control. The most important point to 
emphasize is that the pilot should not panic. The task at hand may seem 
overwhelming, and the situation may be exacerbated by extreme fears. Therefore, 
the pilot must make a conscious effort to relax. The pilot must understand that the 
most important task is to keep the wings level. An uncontrolled turn or roll usually 
results in difficulty reaching any desired flight conditions. The pilot finds that good 
roll control makes it much easier to control the pitch. The pilot should remember 
that a person cannot feel the control pressure with a firm grip on the control lever. 
Relaxing and learning to “control the eyes and the brain,” and not just the muscles, 
usually requires significant conscious effort. 
The pilot must believe what the flight instruments indicate about the position 
of the aircraft, regardless of what the natural senses say. The vestibular sense (the 
perception of movement by the inner ear) can be confusing to the pilot. Due to 
inertia, the sensory regions of the inner ear cannot detect subtle changes in aircraft 
position, nor can they accurately detect changes in position that occur at a constant 
speed over a period of time. On the other hand, there are often false sensations that 
lead the pilot to believe that the attitude of the aircraft has changed, when in fact it 
is not. These false sensations lead to spatial disorientation of the pilot.  
 
2.3.1. Attitude Control 
The aircraft is designed as a stable platform and, with the exception of 
turbulent air, maintains an approximately straight and level flight when properly 
balanced and left alone. It is designed to maintain a balance in pitch, roll and yaw. 
However, the pilot should be aware that changing one axis affects the stability of 
others. A typical light aircraft exhibits good yaw stability, slightly less on the pitch 
axis and even less on the roll axis. 
Thus, the key to emergency attitude control of an aircraft is: 
• Trim the airplane with the elevator trim to maintain level, hands-free flight 
 
 
at cruising speed. 
• Resist the tendency to over-control the aircraft. Use your fingers to operate 
the orientation indicator. Position may not be changed unless the flight instruments 
indicate a clear need for change. 
• Make all attitude changes smooth and small, but with positive pressure. 
Remember that a small change indicated on the horizon is proportional to a much 
larger change in the actual position of the aircraft. 
          • Use any available attitude controls such as autopilot or wing leveler. 
The main orientation control tool is the orientation indicator. Once the 
airplane has been trimmed so that it maintains level flight without arms at cruising 
speed, this speed should not change until the airplane is lowered for landing. All 
turns, ups and downs can and should be done at this speed. Direct flight is 
maintained by keeping the wing level with the help of “fingertip pressure” on the 
steering wheel. Any pitch change should be made using a strip no more than one 
width up or down. 
The pitch angle controls the flight speed. Thus, the engine power (translated 
by the propeller into thrust) maintains the selected height. After a decrease in 
power, even a small one, there is an almost imperceptible decrease in flight speed. 
However, even a small change in speed results in less stress on the tail, with the 
result that the estimated nose weight of the aircraft causes the aircraft to descend 
just enough to maintain the speed it was tuned to. Then the plane descends at a 
speed directly proportional to the value of the removed thrust. The power derate 
must be in 100 rpm or 1 inch manifold pressure increments, and the resulting 
descent rate must never exceed 500 fpm. The wings must be held horizontally at 
the orientation indicator and the pitch must not exceed the width of the strip below 
the level. 
EFIS failure indications can be completely different from those of 
conventional instruments, making it much more difficult for the pilot to recognize a 
system failure. The lack of system standardization exacerbates the problem by 
making equipment-specific information and knowledge necessary to troubleshoot 
electronic display faults. The inability to simulate certain failure modes during 
 
 
training and assessment makes the pilot less prepared for a real emergency. As 
electronic avionics becomes technically advanced, the training and skills required 
to safely operate these systems must keep pace with the times. 
The key to successfully managing an emergency and/or preventing an 
abnormal situation from escalating into a real emergency is to be thoroughly 
familiar with and followed by the aircraft manufacturer's FAA procedures. (FAA) 
approved aircraft flight manual and/or pilot's manual (AFM/POH). 
 
2.3.2. Psychological hazards during airplane control 
There are several factors that can affect a pilot's ability to act quickly and 
correctly in an emergency. Some of these factors are listed below. 
• Reluctance to accept an emergency. A pilot who allows his mind to be 
paralyzed at the thought of a plane on the ground in a very short time, regardless of 
the pilot's actions or hopes, is seriously failing to deal with an emergency. 
Unconscious desire delaying a dangerous moment can lead to such errors like: 
inability to lower the nose to maintain airspeed, delay in choosing the most suitable 
landing zone within reach, and hesitation in general. Desperate attempts to fix what 
went wrong by flying the plane fall into the same category. 
• Desire to save the airplane. A pilot who has been trained during training to 
expect to find a relatively safe landing zone whenever the flight instructor closes 
the throttle to simulate a forced landing can ignore all basic flight rules to avoid 
landing in terrain where damage to the aircraft is imminent.  
Typical consequences are: making a 180° turn back to the runway when the 
available altitude is insufficient; stretch the glide path without taking into account 
the minimum reference speed in order to enter a more attractive field; acceptance of 
an approach and landing situation that leaves no room for error. The desire to save 
an aircraft, regardless of the risks involved, can be influenced by two other factors: 
the pilot's financial interest in the aircraft and the assurance that the undamaged 
aircraft will not result in bodily harm. However, there are times when the pilot must 
be more interested in donating the plane so passengers can get away from it safely. 
Anxiety about getting hurt – fear is a vital part of the self-preservation 
 
 
mechanism. However, when fear leads to panic, we invite what we most want to 
avoid. Survival records favor pilots who maintain their composure and know how 
to apply general concepts and procedures developed over the years. The success of 
an emergency landing depends not only on skill but also on intelligence. 
 
2.4. General principles of crew training on simulators 
Simulators play a special role in pilot training. This is due to the fact that 
simulators are one of the main technical means of training aircraft crews. Aviation 
simulators for various purposes create such information models of reproducible 
flight conditions in real time so that the visual perception and motor response of a 
trained pilot do not differ from real ones. For this purpose, in the cockpit (or its 
fragment) of the aircraft simulator is installed, as a rule, equipment identical to the 
real one. The geometrical sizes of models of cabins of aircraft, an arrangement of 
devices, indicator devices and controls correspond to the real ship. However, the 
general similarity, although of great importance, does not yet ensure the 
reproduction on the simulator of the most important moments of the pilot's work, 
which allow to form the necessary professional skills. 
The question of what factors of flight conditions of the aircraft, in what 
completeness and with what accuracy should be simulated on the simulator, is 
weighed on the basis of psychological analysis of the pilot's interaction with the 
real environment and determined by the specifics of the tasks. This takes into 
account the psychological structure of the formed skills, which includes the 
purpose of the action, the peculiarities of perception, attention, thinking, the nature 
of movements. 
 
2.4.1. Analyses of the existing training methodology and crew training 
devices in the flight process 
To perceive the conditions of the real process on the simulator implements a 
mathematical model of the movement of the aircraft and models of all its major 
systems. In this case, in accordance with the control effects of the trained pilot, 
 
 
which are introduced into the model, reproduce in real time situations similar to 
those arising in flight. 
The parameters received as a result of modeling are deduced on devices and 
means of indication of the pilot's panel. At the same time in optical devices and 
portholes the external visual situation is reproduced as much as possible, by means 
of the corresponding simulators connected with model of dynamics of PS so that 
the picture observed on the simulator corresponds to a real at a similar condition in 
flight. 
As a rule, the simulators simulate the physical factors of flight conditions, 
which cause the trained pilots to feel adequately related to their activities in real 
flight conditions. 
Optimization of pilot training on simulators is also achieved by such 
methodological techniques as re-reproduction of particularly complex control 
elements of the aircraft, input of faults, fixation of training exercises for prompt 
analysis of errors by the instructor, self-control and other methods. 
In some cases, for example, to develop skills to perform transient control 
processes of the aircraft there is a need for their slower reproduction (learning in an 
unrealistic time scale), followed by a gradual transition to real time. 
The specificity of the pilot's training on simulators is associated with such a 
feature as the inability to create on one simulator the full range of physical 
conditions and factors that accompany the flight. Therefore, the formation of the 
necessary professional skills of pilots is carried out element by element on 
simulators for various purposes. At the final stage of pilot training, they 
consciously integrate a generalized internal image of future activities. The task of 
forming such an image in the pilots on the simulators is solved by psychologists 
and instructors who guide the training. In this regard, the planning of training 
cyclograms is of particular importance. It is based on the stages associated with the 
element-by-element mastery of complex types of professional skills. The sequence 
of stages of preparation for dynamic operations on the simulators is as follows: 
• theoretical training and acquisition of general operator culture; 
 
 
• formation of a range of private skills that are part of the integrated skill 
required to perform this dynamic operation; 
• formation of skills to perform individual isolated operations; 
• formation of skills of performance of separate operations in a complex of 
consecutive actions; 
• formation of skills of performance of dynamic operation in emergency 
situations and non-standard ways; 
• transfer of skills from training models to a real control object. 
The leading role in achieving this goal belongs to the crew instructor, who 
directly carries out the training process and determines the readiness of the crew to 
fly. At the same time he solves a number of problems in two main directions. 
Psychologically: 
• study of individual psychological characteristics of crew members, their 
language and style of activity; 
• research of influence of mental tension, fatigue, emotional influences and 
features of the neuropsychic organization of the pilot on efficiency of its activity 
and variation depending on it of intensity of its loading; 
• identification of "reserves" and the possibility of using them in extreme 
conditions; 
• accounting for the price of physical and mental costs of the pilot when 




2.4.2. Training conditions of pilots 
During the training, pilots consistently and purposefully form a conceptual 
model of flights. However, the imaginary image and general intellectual baggage of 
the pilot are only the basis for his work. It includes a range of psychological 
processes, such as active perception, memory, thinking, decision-making, and then 
motor operations that require not physical activity, but precise and coordinated 
movements.The generalized structural scheme of the modern simulator irrespective 
 
 
of its type and appointment contains five basic blocks: a workplace of the pilot, 
system of simulation of a visual situation, computer system, the control panel and 
the coordination device. The technical level of implementation of this structure 
determines the ratio of training conditions and flight conditions, i.e. the degree of 
their similarity. 
Modern simulators for professional training of pilots are implemented on the 
basis of training systems or networks. 
 
2.4.3. Pilot's workplace 
Full-size models or fragments of aircraft, the interior of which corresponds to 
a real aircraft, are installed on specialized and complex aircraft simulators. All 
equipment, information display system and aircraft controls, with which the crew 
works or comes into contact, correspond to the regular ones in all characteristics. 
The same part of the equipment that is not included in the circuit of modeling the 
control processes of the aircraft (this applies primarily to specialized simulators or 
stand-simulators), made in the form of weight and dimensional models. 
The means of information equipped with the information display system on 
the simulator facilitates the creation of the illusion of the flight of the aircraft, its 
position in space and the operation of various systems and units. The illusion of 
pilots flying during the training exercise is also enhanced by the creation of a real 
acoustic environment in the aircraft model by simulating engine noise, noise from 
the operation of mechanics, hydraulics and pneumatics, as well as simulation of 
radio communication with air traffic control and ground stations. 
Further approximation of the simulator conditions to the flight when 
performing various operations is carried out by simulating the physical movement 
of the aircraft by installing its layout on a moving platform. In the general case the 
mobile platform should have six degrees of freedom - three linear movements and 
angular: on a course, a roll and a pitch. The acceleration sensations of the pilot in 
this case are synchronized with changes in the external visual environment in the 
portholes and optical devices of the aircraft layout. 
 
 
Reproduction of real speeds and accelerations of the aircraft at different 
stages of flight on a dynamic simulator in full is impossible. But there is no special 
need for this. This is due to the peculiarities of the human vestibular apparatus, 
which perceives primarily the transients of both linear and angular velocities. 
In order to create an adequate perception on the simulator of the real 
accelerations of the aircraft and simulated, the fronts of the transients are 
reproduced at a scale of 1:1 to moments corresponding to the limit of sensitivity, ie 
saturation of the human vestibular apparatus. The pilot, performing dynamic 
operations in the moving cockpit, receives from the front of the acceleration all the 
initial sensations of movement, which are necessary for adequate perception of real 
and simulated conditions. 
After reproducing the real acceleration front, the platform is braked, and the 
decline of the braking front is below the threshold of sensitivity of the vestibular 
apparatus of the pilot, otherwise he may have erroneous sensations. Thus, 
proceeding from limiting sizes of movement of a mobile platform on linear and 
angular movements, it is transferred to neutral position with the speeds and the 
accelerations imperceptible to the vestibular device of the pilot. 
The "reaction" of the external visual situation in the portholes and optical 
means of observation of the aircraft layout to the pilot's control influences during 
the training exercise also greatly contributes to the creation of a psychologically 
adequate real environment at the information display system. 
 
2.4.4. Visual training simulation system 
Of all the information about the state of the aircraft, perceived by the sensor 
field of the pilot, more than 80% comes through the visual channel. That is why the 
role of means of simulating the visual environment on the simulator is so 
important. 
The pilot, perceiving on the simulator the visual information and the 
information arriving on other channels of a sensory field (auditory, vestibular, etc.), 
forms influences on controls of the aircraft from what the spatial position of the 
aircraft, and hence a visual situation changes. After its change, the pilot controls the 
 
 
movements of the aircraft, performs the necessary maneuvers with orientation on 
the ground or in space. According to the relevant landmarks, it determines the 
orientation angles of the aircraft, the increase of these angles, angular velocities, 
velocity and direction of movement, as well as the current coordinates (planar or 
spatial). 
The nature of the change in the visual situation in the portholes and optical 
means of observation of the aircraft is determined by the characteristics of the 
objects of observation and the dynamic characteristics of the aircraft. 
Due to the fact that the movement of the aircraft in the General case is 
carried out in three-dimensional space, the image structure of the visual 
environment is dependent on six coordinates (three Cartesian and three Euler), 
which requires proper transmission of the perspective of reproduced visual 
conditions. An important role is played by the characteristics of the means of 
observation. 
In addition, the "reaction" of the visual environment to the control effects 
given by the trained pilot must be identical to the flight conditions, otherwise the 
control characteristics of the aircraft on the simulator will be distorted and the 
perception of the simulator conditions will not be adequately real. 
When moving the aircraft in space in the field of view of the pilot there is a 
continuous change in perspective and relative size of the observed objects as the 
distance to them changes. Changing the perspective of the visual environment is 
strictly related to the movement of the aircraft in time and space. The movement 
observed by the pilot in real conditions agrees with the physical movement that 
affects the vestibular apparatus and tactile system of the pilot. Therefore, a special 
role in the simulator is given to the synchronization of the dynamics of the visual 
environment with the control effects of the pilot. With the appearance of delays, the 
visual environment can be misinterpreted, which can lead to the formation of 
negative skills in pilots. 
 
2.4.5. Control and management 
 
 
Training pilots on modern simulators is a controlled process in which their 
professional qualities are purposefully changed. This process is carried out in 
stages under the guidance of a crew instructor and a psychologist. 
At the initial stage, pilots get acquainted with the interior of the pilot's 
workplace (RMP), its equipment, the location of information display facilities, 
optical devices and aircraft controls. 
At the stage of training on specialized simulators pilots consolidate 
theoretical knowledge and acquire professional skills to perform certain operations, 
techniques, control modes in normal and abnormal flight modes of the aircraft. The 
duration of training on each of the simulators depends on the individual abilities, 
level of knowledge, specialization and past experience of the crew members. After 
formation of confident skills of performance of separate operations and receptions 
transition to complex simulators where the most comprehensive preparation of 
crew is carried out is carried out. 
Comprehensive training is the final stage of preparation, when all stages of 
the flight of the aircraft are consistently worked out. On complex simulators, the 
crew commander, compared to other members, performs the largest number of 
trainings, which is due to his personal responsibility for the implementation of vital 
stages of the flight. A significant number of trainings on complex simulators are 
aimed at the crew acquiring skills in detecting emergency and emergency flight 
situations and finding ways out of them. 
Each session on the simulator includes instruction and analysis of training. 
The briefing covers the most important aspects of the future training exercise: 
characteristics of the stages of the aircraft flight, information about the aircraft 
systems, the order of the crew in normal and emergency situations, information 
about the restrictions imposed by the simulator, etc. 
At the end of each training the instructor makes an analysis, during which the 
performed training exercise is analyzed in detail and conclusions about the 
achieved successes are made, mistakes are noted and unlearned sections of the 
theoretical course are revealed. 
 
 
As you gain professional experience, the duration and frequency of 
instruction and analysis decreases. 
At all stages of training, the simulators include devices and devices that 
provide: control over the progress of training, assessment of the actions of the 
trained pilot, operational management of the training process, adjustment of the 
training program. 
The control and evaluation of the pilots' activity is carried out on the basis of 
objective criteria that take into account accurate, temporary and reliable 
performance indicators that characterize the probable probability of fulfilling the 
tasks assigned to the crew. 
Improving the effectiveness of training on simulators is achieved by solving 
the following tasks: 
• registration of actions of pilots n on control of aircraft in dynamic modes; 
• control and registration of the trajectory of the aircraft or controlled 
parameters; 
• prompt presentation of any learner objective indicators that characterize the 
errors in size and sign; 
• registration and reproduction in real time of the performed training exercise 
or its phase in which mistakes were made; 
• formation of objective assessments of pilots' professionalism; 
• assessment of psychophysiological tension of pilots during training; 
• registration of the visual environment observed by students at the RMP and 
its reproduction during the analysis of training. 
 
2.4.6. Antistress pilots training 
Methodical recommendations for increasing the level of counteraction to 
pilot pilot linings, developed on the basis of a process approach, are intended to fill 
this theoretical and methodological gap, and is one of the first methods that allow 
the instructor and pilot initially theoretically, and then practically to understand the 




In the process of flight training pilots are purchased and fixed certain flight 
skills in various special situations. The complex simulator aircraft (CSA) simulates 
the behavior of the aircraft in the event of functional failures, adverse weather 
conditions, the occurrence of fires and their various combinations. The pilots 
successfully mastered the appropriate algorithms of action, and it would seem that 
this should limit the preparation process. However, in practice, we often encounter 
incorrect decisions made by pilots, with the flight parameters being exceeded for 
restrictions imposed by the Aircraft Flight Operation Manual (AFOM). 
The above problem is proposed to allow a special type of training pilots to 
fly in special situations training against any one simultaneously affects the pilot 
negative factors (factor overlays) antistress program. 
To the negative phenomena should include the process of factor resonance. 
An assessment of the first signs of its appearance is fundamentally important for 
preventing aviation events. The first signs of the phenomenon of factor resonance 
(FR) are the following areas of factor fluctuations in the flight process, which, with 
an increase in the number of simultaneously acting factors the appearance of factor 
lining (FL) can lead to an emergency or catastrophic situation. The first sign of FR 
is a resonant curve with a small amplitude and period. 
In the process approaches, the concept of "antistress training" was proposed 
by E. M. Hohlovym in 1973. 
The simulation of the FN on the CCS has made it possible to find out that 
pilots may have the effect of amplifying the amplification of dynamic stereotype 
(DS) piloting in special situations of flight. This phenomenon of strengthening of 
the DS can occur in 70% of pilots and is accompanied by an exit beyond the 
permissible limitations of flight parameters. 
If eliminating this negative phenomenon, occurring in 70% of pilots, then 
there is the possibility of preventing such flight accidents. 
To detect PADS we use qualitative and quantitative methods for determining 
the change of DS. The methodology of flight preparation for the analysis of flights 
with the presence and absence of FL is proposed. Compares the oscillograms of a 
pair of training flights (with or without FL) on a simulator or on an airplane. 
 
 
It is especially important to determine the quantitative change of the DS 
using trend algorithms. To analyze the change in the quality of the flight, according 
to some parameters that are fixed by the DS, algorithms for the relative difference 
are used to identify the PADS. For the account of PADS and estimation of the 
quality of piloting equipment in the process of flight preparation algorithms of 
absolute difference in the parameters of zones through the poly-parametric 
algorithms of double delta are proposed. 
For the analysis of the graph of autocorrelation function, the following 
basic parameters are used: 
1) the average period of oscillations that characterizes the dominant 
frequency (it can be found by multiplying the number of quantization steps in 
one period by the value of the quantization step in seconds); 
2) the correlation interval or the attenuation rate – the period of time in the 
course of which the correlation function "extinguishes". The longer the 
correlation interval, the higher the regularity of the waves in the EEG, and the 
smaller this interval, the more rigorous processes in the EEG are expressed in 
the EEG; 
 3) the area under the curve of the autocorrelation function; 
 4) the ratio of the periodic and random component. To quantify this 
parameter, enter the coefficient: KP/R=А/(R -A). 
The power of the periodic component is calculated as half the average 
amplitude of the waves of the autocorregram (A = 1/2a, where a is the average 
amplitude of the values of the autocorrelation function), and the power of the 
random component is the difference between the maximum value of the 
autocorrelation function A/(R = 1) and the power of the periodic component.  
Many events in the air are the result of human error, but most pilots (and this 
is humanly understandable) are reluctant to admit that they could have made 
mistakes. Therefore, today the latest flight simulators have video cameras, which 
allows you to have a complete audio - visual recording of everything that happens. 
Instructors and students then review this record together. The instructor points out 
the mistakes of the students, after which the group analyzes them. Another 
 
 
advantage of the video is that it reveals shortcomings in the interaction between the 
commander and the co-pilot. You can create many more situations on the simulator 
than in a real plane. He can simulate almost any situation - good and bad, and in the 
plane it is impossible. It is important for students to know what to do if they 
encounter such situations in real flight. 
When conducting exercises on the simulator, you can change the weather, 
you can get snow, thunderstorms and even a typhoon on the simulator. All this is 
very realistic. But for training in real flight conditions for the trainee should always 
be good weather. 
Intensive use of training equipment in the preparation (retraining) of the 
flight crew significantly reduces the time to acquire stable skills in the technique of 
piloting the mastered type of aircraft. According to military experts, about 80%. 
flight tasks can be successfully completed on flight simulators. In addition to a 
significant reduction in flight training time, it provides significant savings in 
material costs. It is established that the preliminary practice of the elements of 
flight tasks on the simulator contributes to a better assimilation of them during the 
training flight. 
In the learning process, an important role is given to the instructor, which is 
like a link between all the elements of the training program. He instructs and 
analyzes classes on the simulator, monitors the pilot's program, linking the entire 
training system into one whole and ensuring the continuity of the learning process. 
The teaching staff pays maximum attention to the training of students and much 
less - to the performance of administrative duties. 
Complexation of the educational process is carried out by connecting the 
monitor of the training system using a computer on the instructor's console, work 
consoles of those who are trained, and personal computers to the local computer 
network. 
In general, modern training systems have the following advantages: 
• The capabilities of the listener and instructor are expanded; the workload is 
greatly reduced. With the help of the PAC, you can quickly program various output 
data and enter information about emergencies and other parameters into the 
 
 
computer in real time. If required, the entire programming process can be fully 
automated. 
• The instructor's ability to use the necessary information during instruction 
and analysis of classes is increased. The teacher always has a record of avionics 
readings made during the last lesson. 
• Effective training and active intervention of the instructor in the system. 
Success data is compiled using a computer based on the data contained in the 
training program. If necessary, the instructor may recommend that the student 
conduct additional classes, and enter the necessary data into the system or into the 
curriculum. 
Modern complex aircraft simulators have the maximum realism and 
proximity of the simulated situation and the implementation of full flight training 
of crew members due to the following technical capabilities: 
• Carrying out all types of training; 
• High accuracy of simulation of real flight conditions and operation of 
aircraft systems; 
• Maximum approximation of the interior of the simulator to a particular 
aircraft; 
• Application of adequate mathematical models created on the basis of data 
obtained from the aircraft developer; 
• Visualization system with a sufficient level of detail and quality of display 
of external space; 
• Extensive possibilities of scene modeling; 
CONCLUCIONS 
An important element of crew training is the training of air strikes on the 
simulator. Attempts to partially control the aircraft using onboard instruments while 
searching outside the aircraft to visually confirm the information provided by these 
instruments lead to inadequate aircraft control. This can be followed by spatial 
disorientation and complete loss of control. It is important to emphasize that the 
pilot should not panic. The pilot must believe what the flying instruments are 
showing about the position of the aircraft, regardless of what the natural senses say. 
 
 
The vestibular sense (the perception of movement by the inner ear) can be 
confusing to the pilot. there are often false sensations that lead the pilot to believe 
that the attitude of the aircraft has changed, when in fact it is not. These false 
sensations lead to spatial disorientation of the pilot.  
The main orientation control tool is the orientation indicator. Once the 
aircraft has been balanced so that it can maintain level flight unarmed at cruising 
speed, that speed should not change until the aircraft is lowered for landing. All 
turns, ascents and descents can and should be done at this speed. Straight flight is 
maintained by holding the wing in a horizontal position using "fingertip pressure" 
on the steering wheel. Any change in pitch should be done in a strip no more than 
one width up or down. 
Modern simulators for professional training of pilots are implemented on the 
basis of training systems or networks. During the training process, pilots 
consistently and purposefully form a conceptual flight model. At the stage of 
training on specialized simulators, pilots consolidate theoretical knowledge and 
acquire professional skills to perform certain operations, techniques, control modes 
in normal and non-standard aircraft flight modes. The duration of training on each 
simulator depends on the individual abilities, knowledge level, specialization and 
past experience of the crew members. After the formation of confident skills in 
performing individual operations and techniques, the transition to complex 
simulators is carried out, where the most comprehensive training of the crew is 
carried out. 
A significant number of trainings on complex simulators are aimed at 
acquiring the skills of the crew in detecting emergency and emergency flight 
situations and finding ways out of them. 
It is especially important to quantify the change in DS using trend 
algorithms. To analyze the change in flight quality for some parameters that are 
recorded by DS, relative difference algorithms are used to identify PADS. To take 
into account PADS and assess the quality of flight equipment in the process of 
preparing for a flight, algorithms for the absolute difference in zone parameters 
through polyparametric double delta algorithms are proposed. 
 
 
Intensive use of training equipment during training (retraining) of the flight 
crew significantly reduces the time for acquiring stable skills in the technique of 
piloting the aircraft being mastered.  
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ROLE OF ALARMING SYSTEM AND METHODOLOGY OF CREW 
ACTING IN CASE OF FAILURES IN AVIONICS 
 
3.1. Analysis of alerting system failures in commercial aviation accidents 
The role of an alerting system is to make the system operator aware of an 
impending hazard or unsafe state so the hazard can be avoided or managed 
successfully. A review of 46 commercial aviation accidents (between 1998 and 
2014) revealed that, in the vast majority of events, either the hazard was not alerted 
or relevant hazard alerting occurred but failed to aid the flight crew sufficiently. 
For this set of events, alerting system failures were placed in one of five phases: 
Detection, Understanding, Action Selection, Prioritization, and Execution. This 
study also reviewed the evolution of alerting system schemes in commercial 
aviation, which revealed naïve assumptions about pilot reliability in monitoring 
flight path parameters; specifically, pilot monitoring was assumed to be more 
effective than it actually is. Examples are provided of the types of alerting system 
failures that have occurred, and recommendations are provided for alerting system 
improvements. 
 
3.1.1. The Role of Alerting in a Safety-Critical System 
Successful hazard identification during development of a safety-critical 
system results in reduced hazards and/or mitigations for managing hazards when 
they occur, and, therefore, these hazards are unlikely to lead to an airplane upset or 
loss. For commercial aviation, hazards can take many forms; for example, there are 
hazards tied to:  
• airplane systems failures; e.g., a hydraulics system failure that could lead to 
an inability to move control surfaces 











 • external threats; for example, high terrain or obstacles, icing, or windshear  
• hazardous changes to the flight path; for example, airspeed dropping too 
low or rolling to a high bank angle 
 • ensuring the airplane is configured appropriately prior to initiating certain 
phases of flight; for example, for take-off 
Airplane developers strive to create an alerting system for the hazards that 
cannot be designed out. Alerting, ideally, can allow the flight crew to become 
aware of a hazard’s presence before it becomes a threat to safe flight, or, if it does 
become a threat, manage it to avoid an airplane upset or loss. In any safety-critical 
system, the alerting system should initiate the appropriate flight crew/pilot response 
for managing a hazard. The alert, along with related elements of the flight deck 
interface and operational procedures, need to help the pilot do the following: 
 1. Orient to an important change. Some salient element, such as a loud 
sound or bright light or both, needs to attract the flight crew’s attention that some 
important change has occurred.  
2. Understand the nature of that change. Some interface element needs to 
describe this important change. Information about the nature of the change, as well 
as the urgency of response and importance of response, need to be presented clearly 
and simply. Ideally, the interface and associated procedures should convey the 
implications for operational decision making.  
3. Identify appropriate actions to take. When there are flight crew actions that 
are recommended to manage the failure or hazard, those actions have to be 
presented to the pilot although, in some cases, an action or small set of actions is 
memorized by the pilot. The alert needs to create a link to those actions, either by 
making them part of the alert or by directing the flight crew to a set of actions to 
ensure they perform the right procedure. 
 4. Identify the priority for the actions. In some non-normal situations, there 
may be a number of actions for the flight crew to take, especially when there are 
multiple alerts. The system interface needs to aid the flight crew in assessing which 





5. Execute the actions efficiently, accurately, and completely, including a 
safe recovery. The system interface and the operational documents need to support 
the flight crew in executing the prescribed actions in a timely manner (i.e., before 
there is an airplane upset or loss). Ideally, the interface allows the flight crew to 
evaluate how well the hazard is being managed as actions are being taken.  
These five steps can be referred to as the integrated alerting-to-recovery 
sequence, and this sequence can be used to analyze how well the alerting system 
works when hazards are encountered. This approach broadens the usual bounds of 
alerting to make the point that there needs to be an integrated approach between the 
initial “alert,” the system interface, and operational procedures to ensure all five 
steps are supported. These steps in the integrated alerting-to-recovery sequence can 
also be used to understand the point at which a breakdown in alerting contributes to 
an accident or incident. For example, there have been aviation accidents and 
incidents in which the flight crew oriented to a change but did not understand the 
nature of the change, or, cases in which the flight crew oriented and understood the 
nature of the change but failed to identify the appropriate actions to respond to it. 
This type of analysis can aid in identifying vulnerabilities in an airplane’s alerting 
system or in the use of the accompanying procedures. 
 





3.1.2. Alerting System Basics for Commercial Transport 
Aircraft Alerting, for the purposes of this report, refers to a change in the 
interface that is meant to attract attention, which could be a sound or voice (e.g., 
“pull up”), onset of a light or a message in a specified area (e.g., Master warning 
light), a pop-up of a message in a central location (e.g., traffic collision avoidance 
system [TCAS] graphics on the primary flight display [PFD]), or flashing of a 
display element (e.g., airspeed tape indicator). Alerting systems in large, 
commercial transports (i.e., 14 CFR part 25) are complex and widely distributed. In 
most modern airplanes, alerting for airplane system failures are managed largely 
through a central alerting system (e.g., Boeing engine indication and crew alerting 
system [EICAS] or Airbus electronic centralized aircraft monitor [ECAM]). These 
alerts are prioritized by urgency and can be inhibited (for some alerts in certain 
flight phases). In addition to centralized aircraft system alerting, other elements of 
alerting can be found on the PFD, glareshield/mode control panel, the head-up 
display (HUD), the control column, overhead panel, and other parts of the forward 
panel. 
14 CFR 25.1322 and Advisory Circular (AC) 25.1322-1 provide regulatory 
requirements and guidance for aircraft alerting. Airplane alerts are organized into 
warning, caution, and advisory categories (called Level 1, 2 and 3 in an Airbus 
airplane) according to 14 CFR 25.1322.  
The definitions for these are  
• Warning: Conditions that require immediate flight crew awareness and 
immediate flight crew response.  
• Caution: Conditions that require immediate flight crew awareness and 
subsequent flight crew response.  
• Advisory: Conditions that require flight crew awareness and may require 
subsequent flight crew response. Warning- and Caution-level alerting must contain 
at least two sensory modalities of alerting, typically a visual and an aural alert. 
Most modern airplanes have a Master Caution/Master Warning system that 
presents a visual alert in the central field of view and salient aurals. Warning-level 
 
 
visual alerts are red, and Caution-level visual alerts are amber/yellow. Below are 
some examples of Warnings and Cautions: 
 • Warning-level hazards of interest – Autopilot Disconnect – Engine Fail or 
Engine Out – Windshear – Ground Proximity – Stall/Stick shaker (approach to 
stall) – TCAS Resolution Advisory (TCASRA) – Overspeed – Cabin Altitude – 
Take-off Configuration  
• Caution-level hazards of interest – Autothrottle Disconnect – Low Airspeed 
– Unreliable Airspeed – Bank Angle 
Data Gathered Each of the selected event reports was reviewed to capture the 
following information: 
 • event date  
• airline/operator and flight number (when the report gave one)  
• location of event 
 • accident category (e.g., controlled flight into terrain [CFIT])  
• airplane manufacturer and type (e.g., Boeing 737-800)  
• phase of flight when event occurred  
• local time when event occurred  
• weather/visibility (instrument meteorological conditions [IMC] or visual 
meteorological conditions [VMC])  
• on-board fatalities  
• Captain’s total flight hours and time on type  
First Officer’s (FO) total flight hours and time on type  
• who was the pilot flying (PF) when the event occurred (Captain or FO)  
• what airplane-related hazards occurred during the flight;  
these included:  
– Autopilot disengages. A change from engaged to disengaged, but we only 
counted the cases in which the flight crew was unaware of the autopilot 
disengagement since it is often the result of the pilot disengaging it. 
 – Auto throttle disengage. A change from engaged to disengaged without 
pilot input.  
 
 
– Ground proximity (Terrain Awareness and Warning System [TAWS]): 
sink rate, terrain, pull up).  
The airplane inappropriately flew near terrain.  
– Impending collision (TCAS). The airplane was on course to collide with 
another airplane. 
 – Bank angle. the airplane rolled or was rolled beyond 35°. 
 – Low airspeed. Airspeed dropped below normal operating speeds.  
– Approach to stall/stall. Airplane angle of attack increased to a point where 
the airplane was close to stalling or stalled.  
– Overspeed. Airspeed exceeded normal operating speeds.  
– Unreliable airspeed. Airspeed indication became erroneous due to a fault in 
air data; at least one of the airspeed indicators became invalid but was not labeled 
as invalid.  
– Airplane icing. Icing on the airplane sufficient to change the aerodynamic 
properties of the airplane. 
 – Unreliable attitude information. One of the attitude indicators became 
invalid (but was not labeled as invalid).  
– Take-off configuration. The airplane was not properly configured for take-
off, leading to insufficient lift to fly at the expected take-off speed. 
 – Take-off performance. There was insufficient thrust for take-off with the 
available runway length.  
– Landing configuration/high-energy approach. The airplane landed fast, or 
the approach was above the glidepath or fast, making it difficult to manage the 
landing.  
– Asymmetric thrust. Thrust on the engines was not matched on the two 
engines.  
– Flap asymmetry. Flap position was not matched on the two wings.  
– Windshear.  
A change in wind speed—in some cases, a downward microburst of air—that 
creates sudden shifts in airspeed.  
– Cabin altitude (pressure).  
 
 
Pressure was not maintained in the airplane as it climbed, and the airplane 
could not sustain human life. Engine fail/engine out. Loss of an engine in flight. 
 • whether any hazard that occurred had an alert tied to it  
• all the airplane alerts that occurred, in order, during the flight (taken from 
the flight data recorder [FDR] and cockpit voice recorder [CVR]) 
 • what action(s) the PF should have taken in response to the hazard  
• what action(s) the PF actually took  
• what action(s) the PM (pilot monitoring) took  
• a short synopsis of the event, including a context for the alerting  
• whether alerting was mentioned in the report as a factor in the accident 
 
3.2. Detailed Results: Approach to Stall  
Approach to stall or full aerodynamic stall is at the heart of many LOC 
events; indeed, this hazard occurred in 16 of the 28 events analyzed here. Table 4 
shows the ways in which this hazard occurred in the 16 events; the columns show 
the sequence of hazards (the different paths to the 16 occurrences). In six cases (1st 
grouping), approach to stall followed a low airspeed event that was either not 
alerted or not detected. In three other cases (2nd grouping) a different hazard 
preceded the low airspeed à approach to stall sequence, and again low airspeed was 
not alerted. Note that one of these cases (Thomsonfly) was recovered effectively so 
it does not get tallied in the alerting failures in Table 3.1. In two other events (3rd 
grouping) unreliable airspeed was the specific hazard that preceded the low 
airspeed à approach to stall sequence. And, in two events (4th grouping) unreliable 
airspeed directly preceded the approach to stall. The final three cases (5th grouping 
plus last event) include two in which some hazard other than low airspeed or 
unreliable airspeed preceded the approach to stall, and one case in which no other 
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 Fatalities Synopsis: In cruise, the flight crew had apparent ice crystal icing, 
causing erroneous air data; A/T decreased thrust in response and airspeed 
decreased. Airplane slowed into a stall; the crew did not respond (in actions) to the 
SPD LOW alert; they did not react to the STALL warning (they did not disconnect 
A/P until 25 secs after STALL warning), also they kept in nose-up inputs on the 
controls, leading to a LOC (there is no CVR so some information is missing 
regarding flight crew intentions.)  
Analysis: The unreliable airspeed hazard was not alerted. Low airspeed 
alerting was a visual alert (not aural) that was present for 8 seconds before the stick 
shaker, and there is no evidence that it was detected. For the approach to stall (stick 
shaker) alert, the appropriate actions were not trained or training did not result in 
knowing appropriate actions.  
Hazards: 1. Unreliable Airspeed - No Alert no alert exists in the airplane for 
loss of air data. 
 
 
 2. Low Airspeed - alert - Alert Not Detected there was no response to low 
airspeed alerting.  
3. Approach to Stall - alert - alert detected - alert understood - Crew Selected 
Wrong Actions. Swiftair did not train crew on stall recovery; it was assumed 
airplane protections would prevent entry into stall 
 Alerts (in order of occurrence) (Note: no CVR and some of these are from 
analysis)  
- A/T disengage (visual only)  
- SPD LOW (visual only) 
 - stick shaker/stall (continuous)  
- altitude (continuous) 
 - Autopilot disengage (visual only) 
27/11/08 XL Airways 888 Airbus 320-232 7  
Fatalities Synopsis: Airspeed was allowed to go very low (99 kts); crew was 
trying to slow to alpha floor (for testing) but due to frozen AoA vanes, alpha floor 
was not at the right place on speed tape; airplane pitched up to try to manage the 
lower airspeed and pilot was unable to overcome pitch because he didn't transition 
to manual trim.  
Analysis: The only “alert” for unreliable airspeed was the visual-only 
CHECK GW (gross weight) message, which was probably present for several 
minutes; there was no low airspeed alert; finally, for the approach to stall hazard, 
the flight crew did not understand they needed manual trim to reduce pitch.  
Hazards: 1. Unreliable Airspeed - alert - Alert Not Detected there was no 
response to the CHECK GW message. 
 2. Low Airspeed - No alert an AoA alert existed but failed to perform due to 
frozen AoA sensors. 
 3. Approach to Stall - alert - alert detected - alert understood - crew selected 
right actions - Inadequate Performance pilot didn't use manual trim to reduce pitch 
Alerts (in order of occurrence) - CHECK GW (on MCDU) - Stall warning - Direct 




27/01/09 Empire Airlines 8284 ATR 42-320 0  
Fatalities Synopsis: Initially, there was an unrecognized flap asymmetry due 
to icing. Captain had taken over the controls from the FO after a stick shaker and 
A/P disengage. The FO was unable to manage the controls; the airplane was hard to 
handle due to the flap asymmetry. The airplane slowed down, got to stick shaker 
and GPWS pull up warnings. The Capt reduced power instead of increasing power 
per procedure. Then, later pulled back on column leading to another stick shaker, 
leading to the loss of control. Analysis: There was no alert for flap asymmetry or 
low airspeed; for the approach to stall, the pilot performed actions different from 
those trained or in operational guidance. 
 Hazards: 1. Flap Asymmetry - No alert no alert exists in the airplane for flap 
asymmetry 
          2. Low Airspeed - No alert no alert exists in the airplane for low airspeed  
3. Approach to Stall - alert - alert detected - alert understood - Crew Selected 
Wrong Actions pilot actions did not involve nose down and increased thrust Alerts 
(in order of occurrence) - aural stall (cricket) and Stick Shaker (3 times) - EGPWS 
"Pull up, pull up" - Stick Shaker 1 more time. [5] 
 
3.3. The system alarm about the dangers 
Hazard Communication System (HCS) is a complex of technical aids for 
civil aviation intended for the transmission of information on the occurrence of a 
dangerous situation on board an aircraft by crew and crew flight operators to 
ground control centers through the communication channels of the VHF. 
The MTR is an important pillar of technical support for combating air piracy 
and terrorism. It consists of two subsystems - internal and external. Internal MTRs 
are simple electrical signaling circuits for transmitting an alarm from the salon 
stewardess or passenger compartment to the flight deck. The external SSO includes 
an electronic unit for automatically displaying the earth signal code d via a VHF 
radio transmitter and a power button masked under the pilot cabin accessory, such 
as an electrical outlet. 
 
 
Alarms are alarms signals designed to alert of danger or the onset of action 
when people can be in a hazardous area. The duration of the signal should allow a 
person in the danger zone to leave it or prevent the impact of danger. Typically, 
signals are generated automatically. Used sensors of various measuring devices, 
which react to the parameters of technological processes and the production 
environment. 
There are two types of signaling: sound and light. 
Audio signal should be preferred in case: 
– if the employee's opinion is distracted from monitoring the process; 
– if the visual perception of a signal prevents the environmental impact. 
Light signaling prevails: 
– if the noise level is high; 
– if there are many beeps. 
Types of sound alarm signals: 
– speech signals (single-sentence sentences); 
– non-voice signals (bells, sirens, etc.) 
Requirements to the signals: 
1. It should be heard in the background of noise or other sound signals; 
2. Signals must be different from other audio signals; 
3. Signals must draw attention without affecting other important and 
important work functions. 
Light signaling is used to inform about working conditions: normal mode, 
inoperative position, emergency situation. Elements of the light signal can be used 
to transmit commands or information.  
Characteristics of the signal: brightness, color, flashing frequency. 
Signal requirements: 
1. The light element should be 2 times brighter than the surrounding 
background; 




3. It is recommended to use flashing light as a signal and avoid sharing 
colors that are easy to confuse. 
The assignment of signals should be familiar to all employees. Tables of 
signals are placed in the workplace or in the working mechanism. Every mis-
presented or obscure signal should be taken as a "stop" signal. 
A flight with all established restrictions, as well as observance of 
meteorological minims, ensures the safe passage of all obstacles. However, there is 
a risk of collision of airplanes with obstacles. This is primarily about the human 
factor. This may be a mistake in navigating the crew or a dispatcher error during 
vectorization. In addition, although it is extremely unlikely that navigational 
equipment may fail. 
GPWS and EGPWS prevention systems for dangerous proximity to the 
ground are the latest line of protection from collisions with obstacles. 
In the 1970s, the term CFIT (Controlled Flight to Terrain) was first 
introduced in the United States, which means a collision of an aircraft with the 
ground (ICAO translation), or a collision of a plane with relief in a controlled 
flight, which would be more correct, since the definition ICAO does not provide an 
understanding of what to call a collision with the surface of the water. Further, by 
the term "earth" we will understand the surface of the water. 
From the state of the art, there are two approaches to addressing the problem 
of delaying alarms. 
In the simplest case, a speed indicator is displayed on the aircraft, which 
displays the speed of the head in conditions of true speed at sea level. Typically, the 
speed scale uses colored or monochrome characters that indicate the braking rate 
Vst and the maximum permissible velocity Vmax, which are determined taking 
into account the stock of strength and rigidity of the design. 
The advantage of the speed indicator as a means of preventing failure is the 
possibility of an early assessment of the possibility of dangerous lowering or 
exceeding speed, because before the stop active rate falls preceded by an active 
increase in speed to some extent angle of attack. This is due to the fact that, against 
 
 
the background of linear loss of speed, the angle of attack increases nonlinearly and 
the stronger, the closer the moment of achieving Vst. 
The main disadvantage of the standard speed indicator as a means of 
stopping the stop is the need for a long distraction pilot's attention. Obviously, a 
one-time short shift of attention to the speed indicator does not give an idea of the 
dynamics of the speed change process, because in the short period of time (average 
0.25 seconds), the average pilot is not able to catch a potentially dangerous speed 
of decrease in speed, while the current during cheat in the case of a pointer, the 
speed of the air may seem safe for the pilot. 
Therefore, due to the need to distract control of the space position of the 
aircraft, control other parameters of the device, provide radio broadcasting, the 
pilot cannot often look at the speed indicator for as long as possible, or transmit as 
often as necessary to correctly assess the longitudinal airplane dynamics. 
As an example of an effect to solve this problem, it can be specifying the 
main flight indicator of the A320. An important feature of this device is the display 
of a vertically oriented arrow on the column speed indicator, the direction, size and 
color of which give the pilot the necessary information about the trend of flight 
speed, along with its current value, which is displayed in digital form. 
The disadvantage of this technical solution, as well as other major flight 
indicators, is the large amount of heterogeneous information that is harder to 
understand in times of temporary shortage than reading the readings of classical 
flight instruments. The problem of lack of time to evaluate the instrument's 
performance is characteristic of small aircraft, where the transient processes occur 
very quickly due to the small mass of the aircraft. 
 The approach to solving a pilot warning problem is to install on the aircraft 
warning systems of dangerous flight conditions based on reading the current or 
threshold angle of attack and the presence of warning devices with a certain 
threshold. 
As an example of a more serious approach to this problem, the AUASP 
device, automatically at the corners of the attack and alarm overloads, is 
widespread on domestic aircraft. [6] 
 
 
The advantage of AUASP is the possibility of correction of the limiting 
value of the angle of attack on accelerometer and counter signals, eliminating false 
alarms and allowing AUASP to be used on high-speed, including supersonic 
aircraft. 
The first disadvantage of AUASP is the difficulty of reading the readings of 
the indicator with two indicators, since in a time deficit only a well-trained pilot 
can interpret the position of the hands. The second disadvantage of AUASP is the 
late sound and light signaling and siren sound signal throughout the time when the 
aircraft is in critical condition, which increases the voltage of the crew and prevents 
its adequate action. 
Also known is a "plane stop warning system" as described in US Pat. Patent 
No. 4,908,619, published March 13, 1990 and filed November 13, 1984. According 
to its technical solution, this warning system is the closest analogue of the present 
invention and comprises a control unit, at least one speed sensor and a 
precautionary device. 
The advantage of this solution is the adaptability of the warning system to 
the specifics of the aircraft with a pronounced lower decent ration of the thrust 
vector of the engines, in which the stall speed in the mode of full thrust decreases 
due to the vertical component of the traction/t force, and sharply increases with 
thrust. 
The disadvantage of this system in addition to the extraordinary technical 
complexity is also the impossibility of giving in advance warning about the 
approach of a dangerous flight regime, since this system does not take into account 
the dynamics of changes in the velocity of air in its work. 
Also known is "A method for predicting the approach of an aircraft wing to a 
stopping position" as described in US Pat. No. 4,563,684, published 01/01/1986, 
Submission Date 10/03/1983. [7] 
This method is based on the simultaneous measurement of airborne velocity 
fluctuations in several zones of the aerodynamic profile, which allows the 
formation of an output signal corresponding to the state of the flux around the wing 
 
 
in the form of the ratio of air velocity to its oscillations, in particular aerodynamic 
wing profiles. 
The disadvantage of this method is the constructive complexity and high 
cost, as well as a late warning about the extinction. 
Also known is "a method for preventing a flight stops with a roll and a 
method for implementing the method" described in US Pat. No. 6,169,496, 
published May 2, 2001, submission date 9.12.1998. 
This method is aimed at improving the safety of flights, including by solving 
one of the most urgent tasks of the flight - the choice between landing "before you" 
and the transformation into a lane when the engine does not fly, and based on a 
comparison of values of the roll, speed, flight height and other parameters, while 
the algorithm of the system provides an assessment of the danger of a known angle 
of the roll in terms of speed and height. 
The disadvantage of this system is that in the presence of the five most 
important parameters is not the flight altitude, but the speed of flight. It is the 
tendency to an active fall in the speed of flight, combined with a roll of more than 
45 degrees, most often means a very rapid breakdown in the corkscrew, especially 
as the failure rate increases with C and overload. In addition, the active increase in 
the angle of attack to destructive values in such cases is calculated in fractions of a 
second, and even the presence of a sufficient height reserve may not help in case of 
false or delayed actions of the pilot in the removal of the aircraft from braking or 
rotation 
Number of accidents caused stopping on types of aircraft equipped with 
speed thresholds and speed indicators indicates that the devices described above 
may not be considered as effective measures to prevent braking and other 
hazardous things separately or in combination. Flight modes, because they either 
require constant monitoring of any device parameter, or they work so late that only 
indicate a critical situation. The choice between these means can also be defined as 




3.4. Regarding of additional pilot notification system in case of failure in 
attack angle sensors or speeds 
It is known that the requirements of the regulatory and technical 
documentation for the operation of the aircraft and systems allow certain levels of 
occurrence of special flight situations: complicated flight conditions, a difficult 
situation, emergency, catastrophic situation. 
Of course, the quality of signaling information systems (SIS) directly affects 
the level of flight safety, including the properties of the crew-aircraft system. 
As a rule, given the relatively low level of quality of SIS and the extremely 
complex functions of decision-making by the crew, failures of SIS are still 
associated with emergency and catastrophic situations. This is due to the fact that 
the existing ASCs in their quality have a number of disadvantages: 
– low level of reliability; 
– a very high false positive rate; 
– the absence of special devices for the recognition of dangerous flight 
situations at the first moment of occurrence; 
– the formation of significant uncertainties in making the decision by the 
crew. [9] 
If the plane for some reason went to a big angle attacks, it is automation can 
cause stalling and spin. Autopilot always deflects ailerons against 
spontaneous roll, that is, doing what in the regime close to dumping, absolutely 
cannot be done. It means that when flying at high angles of attack autopilot must be 
disabled. 
 In this case, it not only does not help, but hurts as when dumping, and when 
withdrawing from a spin. The main problem can occur in the deviation of such 
parameters as speed indicator and angle of attack.  
There is relation between both parameters: if speed is increasing, angle of 
attack should be decreased, and if speed indicator shows decreasing, angle of attack 
should increase. 
At a certain time, a failure can only occur in one device. The attention of the 
pilot should be directed to him. Its formulated by the next property. 
 
 
Ordinary property: the probability of occurrence for an elementary period of 
time more than one event can be neglected compared to the probability of 
occurrence during this period of no more than one event (i.e., the probability of two 
or more events occurring simultaneously is zero). 
In such case, the alarming system can work under the following failures: 
1. Failure of the index of angle of attack.  An increase in angle of attack 
results in an increase in both lift and induced drag, up to a point. Too high an angle 
of attack (usually around 17 degrees) and the airflow across the upper surface of 
the aerofoil becomes detached, resulting in a loss of lift, otherwise known as a stall. 
2. Failure of the index of speed indicator. If the pitot probe is blocked but 
the pitot drains and static ports are free, then in straight and level (cruising) flight 
the displayed IAS will tend to reduce, eventually indicating zero.  
  On the figure there is a scheme, which shows alarming system “Look-




Fig. 3.2 Scheme of signaling in case of failure of indicator 
 
Fig. 3.2 illustrates the way of signal’s path from accepting of different 
parameters to the indications on display. 
 
 
Initially, sensors (angle of attack, speed indicator) accepted parameters. The 
gauge of the aerodynamic angles of the vane is designed to measure local 
aerodynamic angles - angle of attack and angle of slip. Airspeed receiver (pitot 
tube) receives the parameter of airspeed. To determine the airspeed is used speed 
indicators, in which the aerodynamic method of determining the speed is applied.  
Then both parameters come to the calculator, where the difference of 
parameters is calculated. This value is further via the executive mechanism 
displayed on the interface (display).  
If an incorrect discrepancy is found, then most likely a failure occurs in one 
of the sensors. In this case, the check-look system is triggered. It instantly attracts 
the attention of the pilot (human-operator) and gives an indication of a quick data 
check parameter, as well as others (for example, look the level of the tag and on 
artificial horizon). 
The influence of factor loadings (FL) in part of the operators has a 
phenomenon of amplification of dynamic stereotype (PADS), which consists in 
increasing the amplitude of control motions while preserving their general 
structure. 
Operational actions become meaningless, there is the execution of 
traumatized operations, which sometimes end up in confusion or inappropriate 
action, wrong decisions are made. 
Experimental data proving the phenomenon of strengthening the stereotype 
and "flying handwriting" under the action of complex refusals. [10] 
 
3.5. Regarding of FL graphics  
Let’s regard the graphs landing with idle engine №4. It was taken from MK-
400. Experiment137. 





Fig. 3.3 Oscillogram of factor linings when landing with idle engine number 4 
МК-400. Exp.138, G=296 t, M=0.45, H=3100 m, starts from=0 degrees. 
МСА+15. Landing with not issued end flaps. 
 
Fig. 3.4 Oscillogram of factor linings when landing with non-released finite flaps 
It is necessary to measure the amplitude of the change of the angle of the roll 
when assessing the quality of piloting. If you follow the nature of the change of the 
 
 
parameter of the roll under the influence of factor loads, even in normal flight 
(without failing the input), then you can be sure that the plane of the plane changes 
constantly. [11] 
Large pitch angles associated with the psychophysiological state of the pilot 
affect the quality of flight in the horizontal plane. Below is regarded analyzes of the 
quality of the flight in the horizontal plane in pitch in the real flight of the An-148 




Below is constructed a histogram of the pitch angle distribution when 
approaching the pilot after the 2nd turn (excluding the pitch during turns) before 













It can be seen the correspondence of the theoretical normal distribution to the 





Three-parameter Weibull distribution 







3.6. Methodological algorithms for crew training on flight simulator  
The use of flight simulators has become widely accepted in both civil 
aviation and military training. Simulators allow the practice of specific levels of 
training as well as potentially life-threatening maneuvers in the comfort of a 
training center. Therefore, the aviation industry has led the world in the use of 
simulation technology to improve training and safety. 
Simulating usual situations helps the pilot to get familiarized with the 
techniques and environment of a real flight. Actually, simulators nowadays are 
basic tools when training pilots because they allow a good preparation in front of 
situations that otherwise would be catastrophic.  
Moreover, the possibility to simulate in a realistic manner all these 
catastrophic situations turn a good flight simulator into a basic mean to study 
accidents after they have happened. The repetition of the situation with the same 
environment and exact values used in the flight makes possible a trustable 
reconstruction of the actual facts. This plays an important role in aircraft design 
because it leads to an improvement of the parameters of the flight in order to 
prevent the repetition of that kind of situation. 
This methodology has been developed after analyzing of plenty sources 
concerning human factor in aviation, pilots’ types of errors and violations, reasons 
of making mistakes during flight, piloting process under different conditions, such 
as influence of stress. It has been regarded cases of LOC and emergency situations.  
 
 
That’s why it proposed the following method of forming crew actions in case 
of failure in avionics systems. It includes a few steps. 
–Analyzing. Research the worlds aviation market, learn updates concerning 
new training methods. Analyze air crash investigation. Collect the flight data. 
Compare them withing two and more flights. It helps to find the weakness. Then it 
will be regarded on the next stages.  
–Planning. Both trainee and instructor should have a rest before session. 
Lesson plans, Flight Manual (FM), check lists, reference cards and any 
performance calculations should all be prepared in advance of the pre-flight 
briefing. Following the training, the instructor must ensure any snags, defects, 
failures and lost time caused by faulty FSTD operation. 
–Pre-flight and briefing. On this phase should be presented the general goal 
of the training session: the list of the all enabling objectives that will be covered in 
the flight to achieve the aim of the flight. 
 –Flight. FSTD provides some benefits that can be used during the flight 
training phase. Conversely, some drawbacks need to be understood by the 
instructor in order to avoid any negative training. The training needs to be 
progressive with a gradual level of complexity according to the trainee 
competencies and his capability to assimilate the training. However, during training 
sessions, the difficulty should increase progressively. In the case of a complex 
maneuver, it might be beneficial if the instructor first demonstrates and gives 
a brief explanation either before, during or after the demonstration. The trainee 
generally needs supervision and oral guidance during first practice of a new 
maneuvers. 
 A major benefit of FSTDs is the ability to simulate realistic training 
environments on demand and create specific training opportunities for various 
situations such as: 
 • Adverse weather conditions such as fog, rain, snow, strong wind, etc...;  
• Adverse visibility conditions in day/night, Degraded Visual Environment 
(DVE), etc.;  
 
 
• Training to react to environmental safety factors (congested airport, 
diversion, air traffic, etc.);  
• Adverse terrain condition (mountain, maritime, city, etc.).  
FSTDs offer extensive possibilities in emergency and malfunction training. 
One of the most effective forms of learning is by “hands-on” practice and from the 
ability to make errors under safe, controlled conditions. FSTDs provide safe 
environments in which the actions can be repeated, and trainees can make errors 
without risk to themselves, other people, the aircraft and the surrounding 
environment.  
Simulation can therefore be used to mitigate the risks inherent which are not 
possible to the same extent on a real aircraft.  
Examples include, but are not limited to: 
 • Total engine failure and autorotation;  
• Loss of Tail Rotor in critical flight phase – for example with sling load 
Vortex Ring (Settling with power); 
• Undesired Aircraft State (UAS) following entry into Degraded Visual 
Environment (DVE).  
Therefore, it is possible to train for “real” malfunctions on the FSTD which 
is not possible on the real aircraft. For example, the engine malfunction is never 
performed on the real airplane by switching off the engine, but generally by using 
the training mode available on the airplane; on the FSTD you can perform a total 
engine failure without taking any risks. A possibility is to activate malfunctions 
without previous warning to the trainee. However, it is recommended not to give 
multiple failures to the trainee at the same time, unless simulating a realistic 
scenario, as this can cause unnecessary confusion. 
Automation training in FSTD should incorporate the aircraft manufacturers’ 
operating philosophies and recommended practices. This should include: 
 • Understanding the integration of autopilot modes; 
 • Understanding pilot-system interfaces (pilot to system communication and 
system to pilot feedback);  
• Understanding all mode transition and reversion sequences; 
 
 
 • Awareness of available guidance (PFD/ND, modes armed or engaged, 
active targets);  
• Alertness to adapt the level of automation to the task and/or circumstances, 
or to revert to hand flying. 
FSTD is a powerful teaching tool as it can include real experience to achieve 
the learning goal. Once the student is competent in the maneuver, skills, specific 
LOFT or work scenarios can provide an opportunity to experience the situation 
what can happen during a real flight. Scenario-based learning teaches systematic 
risk reduction, critical thinking skills are the most effective way to prepare the pilot 
to make safe decisions while flying. 
LOFT is effective in both aircraft and FSTDs. FSTDs now provide efficient 
tools for reproducing complex operational scenarios to immerse the student in a 
realistic situation. During the flight, while discussing the trainee's mistake, the 
instructor could either freeze the FSTD or take over to enable the student to fully 
focus on these instructions. However, always instructors do not be too critical of 
minor faults in the early stages. Serious faults should be corrected first, and then, as 
noted for improvement, minor bugs were fixed. 
It is also possible to let the script unfold and not interfere. During debriefing 
and through questions. Relevant questions, learners can themselves come up with 
better ways to deal with the situation. Choice depends on the instructor and on the 
appropriateness in the specific situation. 
–Post-flight and Debriefing phase. Before leaving the simulator, the 
instructor should check his notes before summing up, as there may be points 
requiring clarification before leaving the cockpit. The debriefing is done to 
evaluate, guide and facilitate open discussion. Frame work should be: 
- Start with constructive points; 
- Identify errors, causes of errors and improvement strategies. Maximum 
three key areas for improvement for the next flight to prioritize and make 
memorization easier; 




- Complete with a promotion; 
- Open discussion. 
Flight safety is an important aspect of practical training. Instructors can 
influence the attitude and discipline of prospective pilots. To be successful, a safety 
program requires the right attitude, proper oversight, strict adherence and proper 
workout. 
 
For summarized, the following basic principles can be distinguished when 
training pilots on TD: 
          1) Set a clear goal on training.  
          2) Establish and maintain a good instructor/trainee relationship.  
          3) Avoid negative training. 
4) Master the basics before moving into the complex.  
5) Manage malfunction training appropriately. 
6) Let the trainee make errors and improve fault analysis. 
7) Experience complex and emergency situations on the FSTD first. 
8) Promote the good flight safety practices.  



















An alerting system is the greatest method to make the system operator aware 
of an impending hazard or unsafe state. Understand it properly and act immediately 
helped to avoid hazard or managed it successfully.  
One of the worthiest successions in LOC can be approach to stall. This is 
dangerous because airspeed control is a very delicate moment. 
Hazard Communication System is a complex of technical aids for civil 
aviation intended for the transmission of information on the occurrence of a 
dangerous situation on board an aircraft by crew and crew flight operators to 
ground control centers through the communication channels of the VHF. Alarms 
are alarms signals designed to alert of danger or the onset of action when people 
can be in a hazardous area. There are two types of signaling: sound and light. The 
advantage of the speed indicator as a means of preventing failure is the possibility 
of an early assessment of the possibility of dangerous lowering or exceeding speed, 
because before the stop active rate falls preceded by an active increase in speed to 
some extent angle of attack.  The approach to solving a pilot warning problem is to 
install on the aircraft warning systems of dangerous flight conditions based on 
reading the current or threshold angle of attack and the presence of warning devices 
with a certain threshold. 
Nowadays crusual situations are still occurred. There were such accidents 
during flight when unespectable situations starts. Pilots were confused and act 
wrong under the sharply changing of personal state. They become uncontrolled and 
do under stress state. This position pushed them to act reflexively, without thinking 
or either based on old experience. 
A decision to introduce a new alarming system which helps pilots to resist 
stress state had regarded in graduate work. Sometimes pilot did mistake and pull 
steering wheel to himself. This can happen at a critical angle of attack or low speed. 
Crew member can only confuse devises. Result can be disappointed. An 
alarm method in failing cases for pilots has been developed. Such system should 
 
 
warn pilots. They, in turn, should get together and determine which devises fail. 
The main objective of this method is to prevent pilots from state of stress, which 
makes it difficult to assemble and act correctly. And also, methodical 
recommendations were developed by the pilots. 
The trainers are especially suitable for training situations that are impractical, 
difficult, dangerous or expensive to reproduce in a live environment. There are 
many potentially dangerous situations in which crews may be infrequent. If such 
situations arise, they need to be dealt with effectively to avoid serious 
consequences. The simulators can present such unusual scenarios to the listeners in 
a repeatable and controllable way without risk to the crew, aircraft, other operators 






















































Labor protection is a system of legal, socio-economic, organizational and 
technical, sanitary and hygienic, treatment and prevention measures. It aimed at 
preserving human life, health and ability to work. 
The concept of labor protection actually reveals the main directions that 
create a system of safety of life and health of workers in the course of their work. 
This system includes measures that are aimed at creating working conditions that 
meet the requirements of life and safety health of employees in the process of work. 
The main provisions on labor protection are enshrined in the Code of Labor 
Laws. It provides responsibilities for labor protection, the content and procedure for 
approval of instructions on labor protection, requirements for production facilities 
and equipment, free issuance of special clothing and personal protective equipment 
for work with hazardous conditions of labor, etc. 
Labor protection is based on a set of state legislative acts. The general laws 
of Ukraine that determine the main provisions on labor protection are the 
Constitution of Ukraine, the Code of Labor Laws, the Law of Ukraine "On Labor 
Protection", the Law of Ukraine "On Ensuring Sanitary and Epidemic Welfare", the 
Law of Ukraine "On Fire Safety", the Law of Ukraine "On compulsory state social 
insurance against accidents at work and occupational diseases that caused 
disability" and bylaws on labor protection. 
The main legislative document on labor protection is the Law of Ukraine 
“On labor protection”, which was adopted by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on 
October 14, 1992. 
The Law of Ukraine on Labor Protection defines t he provisions on the 
implem ntation of the constitutional right of citizens to protection of their life  
 








and health in the work, regulates relations between the owner of the 
enterprise, institution and organization or its authorized body and employee on 
safety, occupational health and production environment and establishes a single 
procedure for the organization of labor protection in Ukraine. 
Occupational safety at civil aviation enterprises can be at a high level only 
when the country's legislation, industry standards, norms, rules and requirements 
for occupational safety of workers are strictly complied with. 
 
4.1 Analysis of harmful and dangerous production factors 
During work in production, a person can be affected by one or a number of 
dangerous and harmful production. The safety of a technological process can be 
determined by their number and the degree of danger of each of them separately. 
Occupational safety at work is determined by the degree of safety of individual 
technological processes. 
The working place of operator is flight simulator in the laboratory. The 
square of the room is 24 m². There is one flight simulator An-24 in a room with two 
workplaces. There is natural lighting, heating, air-conditioning systems and 
ventilation systems in the laboratory. The worker uses the flight simulator which 
consumes from electricity. 
According to ДСТУ 12.0.003-74 the following dangerous and harmful 
production factors can impact on the worker: 
- increased and decreased values of temperature, humidity and air flow rate 
depending on the microclimate of the laboratory, simulator or crew cabin, which 
can lead to colds – physical harmful factor; 
- increased voltage in the electrical circuit, the short circuit of which can 
occur through the human body when touching damaged parts of electrical 







and inspection of the device and equipment in the cockpit, laboratory and on 
simulators, as a result of insulation damage, etc . – physical harmful factor; 
- the appearance of electrical sparks that occur during operations with 
disconnecting devices, as well as other short circuits, which can lead to burns – 
physical harmful factor; 
- neuropsychiatric state of overload associated with mental tension and 
emotional overload – psychophysiological harmful factor; 
- physical static overload occurs after sitting on place without moving for 
several hours – psychophysiological harmful factor. 
The most dangerous factor is connected with electricity problems in systems. 
In the event of an impingement of a person with electricity, it can lead to the worst 
consequences. 
 
4.2 Measures to reduce the impact of harmful and dangerous production 
factors 
The flight simulator device considered in this paper for the analysis of flight 
multifactoriality is powered by an electric current. Data on the failures entered by 
the instructor from the control panel of the instructor enter the system in the form 
of electrical signals. Therefore, in the following list of measures, special attention is 
paid to electrical safety. 
      To reduce or eliminate the level of dangerous and harmful factors, the 
following measures have been taken: 
1. Complex automation and mechanization of production processes, which 
eliminates human contact with conductive elements. 
2. Improved technological process that prevents damage to the insulation, the 
occurrence of short circuits, excess voltage in the boundary network. Careful 
systematic control of electric current parameters in the limit is carried out. 
3. Workers are provided with the necessary overalls and special equipment, 
as well as other personal protective equipment. 




Sanitary and technical propaganda and training in safe work methods under 
different working conditions were carried out. 
 
4.2.1 Calculation of protective grounding 
Calculate the protective grounding for a comprehensive aircraft simulator.  
According to the state standard ГОСТ 12.1.030-81 the initial data for the 
calculation are according to PUE at U <1000V R = 4 Ohms;  
Let’s determine the calculated value of the resistivity of the soil for vertical 
grounding        
   and strip         
   : 
      
      
    (4.1) 
      
      
    (4.2) 
where ρ is the resistivity of the soil, ρ = 0.4Ohm • m • 10²;  
  
    
  - climatic zone coefficient,   
    
 = 0.5 and 2.0; 
      
                      
      
                      
Determine the current resistance of one vertical grounding by the formula: 
         
      
 
 







    
    
  (4.3) 
where l is grounding conductors - steel pipes, l=2.5m;  
d is the diameter of the pipe, d=0.05m; 
H is laying depth, H = 1.5m; 
 
         
  
   
   
     





     
     
          
  
Calculate the required number of pipes: 
   
   
     
  (4.4) 
 
   
    
 
       
The coefficient of use of a single ground factor, which takes into account the 
mutual shielding of pipes:         
 
 






   
          (4.5) 
Calculate the length of the strip that connects the vertical grounding: 
                              (4.6) 
 where  а – distance between grounding conductors, 2.5m; 
                   
Connection strip current resistance: 
   
     
 
      
    
   
   
  (4.7) 
where  h – depth of laying the strip, 0.8m; 
b – width of the strip, 0.04m. 
   
     
    
      
       
        
         
Coefficient taking into account the mutual shielding of the strip and vertical  
grounding: 
        
Determine the current resistance of the entire grounding device: 
   
      
              
   (4.8) 
   
         
                    
       
The resistance of the grounding device satisfies the requirement Rз<4Ohm. 
 
4.3 Occupational Safety Instruction 
Instruction on labor protection when working on flight simulator. 
 
4.3.1 General safety requirements 
 1) Persons who have studied the design of the device, the procedure for 
working with it and past safety instructions and who have passed the test on labor 
protection are allowed to service the device and its operation. 
 
 
2) Repair and maintenance of the device do only the serviceable tool having 
external isolation and the corresponding marking. 
3) Repair and maintenance of the device do only at the disconnected power 
supply. 
4) It is allowed to install fuses only with the nominal data indicated in the 
diagram. 
5) Replace fuses only after the mains has been de-energized. 
6) Measure the voltage only with certain approved devices. 
7) Do not change the assembly and schematic diagram. 
8) It is strictly forbidden to leave the free ends of the wires uninsulated. 
9) It is forbidden to connect wires in the places which are not provided by the 
assembly scheme. 
10) It is forbidden to wipe parts of the device with the liquids connecting 
combustible materials. 
11 Be able to use primary fire extinguishing means. 
12) The employee must be able to provide first aid to victims of electric 
current and other accidents. 
 
4.3.2 Safety Requirements before starting work 
 Before starting work on the simulator, the operator must check: 
• workplace lighting; 
• serviceability of the available means of the alarm system, control and 
measuring 
  devices; 
• availability and completeness of the first aid kit; 
• serviceability of all displays and devices of the dashboard; 
• visually - serviceability of grounding and starting equipment; 
          • cleanliness and uncluttered workplace objects; 
 
 
          • presence at the workplace of the log of change, instructions for operation of 
equipment, instructions on labor protection and fire safety, as well as instructions 
on alarm. 
All problems and violations detected during the reception should be 
reflected in the variable log and the master should be notified. 
If the time of acceptance of the change coincided with the moment of 
accident or unacceptable deviations in the mode of operation of the unit, the 
change must be accepted only with the permission of the master or shift 
manager. 
The employee is prohibited from: 
-use improper and incorrectly sharpened tools and devices; 
-touch to live parts of electrical equipment, open doors of electrical 
cabinets. If necessary, contact the operational maintenance personnel. 
 
4.3.3 Safety Requirements during operation 
It is necessary to stop the machine and turn off the electrical equipment in the 
following cases: 
• follow signals that warn of danger, observe personal safety measures; 
• faulty sound and light alarm system; 
• turning off the lights; 
• equipment malfunctions, the operation of which is prohibited by the rules 
of technical operation; 
• leaving the machine even for a short time; 
• in case of temporary suspension of work; 
• during a power outage; 
• when cleaning, lubricating, cleaning the machine; 
• upon detection of any malfunction; 
• when tightening bolts, nuts and other fasteners. 
 
4.3.4 Safety Requirements after work 
 
 
- switch off the device; 
- tidy up the workplace; 
- track off all the panels; 
- turn off the lights in the room; 
          - inform the work supervisor about all the shortcomings noticed during work 
and the measures taken to eliminate them. 
 
4.3.5 Safety Requirements at emergency situations 
 In case of a break in the grounding of the machine and other malfunctions 
that can lead to an emergency and accidents, it is necessary: 
4.3.5.1 Immediately stop the operation of the machine until the malfunctions 
are rectified and notify the work supervisor. 
4.3.5.2 Under the guidance of the person responsible for the performance of 
work, promptly take measures to eliminate the causes of accidents or situations that 
may lead to accidents or accidents. 
In the event of a fire, rags, equipment or fire: 
4.3.5.3 Immediately notify the fire brigade by phone "101", notify the 
workers, notify the head of the unit, report the fire to the guard post. 
4.3.5.4 Open emergency exits from the building, de-energize, close windows 
and close doors. 
4.3.5.5 Start extinguishing the fire with primary fire extinguishing 
equipment, if it is not associated with a risk to life. 
4.3.5.6 Arrange a meeting for the fire brigade. 
4.3.5.7 Leave the building and stay in the evacuation zone. 
 In case of accidents: 
4.3.5.8 Immediately arrange first aid for the victim and, if necessary, deliver 
him to a medical organization; 
4.3.5.9 Take urgent measures to prevent the development of an emergency or 
other emergency situation and the impact of traumatic factors on other persons; 
 
 
4.3.5.10 Before starting the investigation of the accident, preserve the 
situation as it was at the time of the accident, if this does not threaten the life and 
health of other persons and does not lead to a catastrophe, accident or other 
emergency, and if it is impossible to preserve it, to fix the current situation (draw 
up diagrams, carry out other activities). 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The issue of labor protection is one of the most important at the present stage 
of our society, at a time when employers set themselves the main task - as soon as 
possible and with minimal investment, to extract the largest amount of profit, and 
taking advantage of recent shortages in the country. pay, and sometimes even 
ignore the requirements of occupational safety. 
The increase in the number of occupational diseases, accidents at work, 
which lead to injuries and sometimes deaths, all this makes us think about the 
perfection of our legislation in the field of labor protection. One of the activities of 
the state to improve the situation in the field of labor protection - is to expand the 
use of local norms, which allows the features of labor protection of a particular 


































Environmental protection is a system of legislative acts and measures aimed 
at reducing the impact of harmful and industrial factors on soil, water, atmosphere, 
vegetation and fauna. 
Environmental protection and environmental issues have become one of the 
most important issues of our time in recent years. At this time in the world is a 
huge struggle to preserve the nature of animals and everything around. 
The main directions of economic and social development are the section 
where the main tasks are set: 
- increase the effectiveness of measures for nature protection; 
- more widely implement advanced dead-end technologies and processes; 
- to develop combined production that provides comprehensive and full use 
of natural resources, raw materials and supplies; 
- significant reduction of harmful effects on the environment. 
Nowadays, the problem of recycling is becoming more common, even when 
there are many organizations that monitor compliance with environmental laws, 
there are cases when companies bury or dump industrial waste into the ground or 
into water bodies. These illegal actions cause huge, often irreparable damage to 
nature. 
In modern aviation, operator activity is becoming increasingly important. By 
its nature, it is increasingly approaching and many other types of employment of 
specialists in the management, control and maintenance of aircraft.  
Its main feature is that a person engaged in work, does not have the 













This interaction is mediated by complex technical systems that transmit 
information to the person about the subject and means of labor, and through which 
it realizes in this subject a conscious goal. 
This diploma project considers the means of advanced training of pilots, 
which would improve the technique of piloting, simplify and accelerate the stage of 
training and preparation of the response of the pilot in the event of a complex 
failure in avionics system. 
Accordingly, the development considered in this project is not able to cause 
direct damage to the environment, because it does not form any substances of 
carcinogenic, toxic or other harmful nature that affect the air, water bodies, 
humans, animals, vegetation or soil. Since this development concerns acting on 
flight simulator, there is an indirect damage to the environment: 
- energy consumption; 
- creation of electromagnetic fields; 
- utilization of used parts and mechanisms. 
Normative documents that regulate design on the topic of the diploma 
project: 
1. ДСТУ 2420-94 Energy saving. Terms and definitions. 
2. P 50-081-2000 Energy saving. Methods for assessing the energy status of 
energy supply systems of industrial enterprises for their certification. 
3. Ministry of Health of Ukraine dated 01.08.96 No. 239 STATE 
SAHITARY HORMS AND RULES OF PROTECTION OF POPULATION 
FROM THE INFLUENCE OF ELECTROMAGICAL RADIATORS. 
4. ДСТУ B В.1.1-8: 2003 – Fire protection CABLE PASSES. FIRE 
RESISTANCE TEST METHOD. 
 
5.1. The effect of electromagnetic radiation on humans 
Electromagnetic field (electromagnetic radiation) occurs when free electrons 
move in a conductor. The transfer of electrical energy is accompanied by intense 
electromagnetic radiation. It has been scientifically proven that electromagnetic 
radiation has a more detrimental effect on the body of living beings than radiation. 
 
 
The fact is that the radiation background has always been on our planet and at 
certain times its level was higher than in the Hernozone "Chernobyl". The level of 
the earth's electromagnetic field increases every year, which is associated with 
human activities. In the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States), the total 
length of only 500-kV transmission line exceeds 20,000 km. (except for the 
transmission line-150 transmission line-300 transmission line-750). Power lines 
and some other power plants create electromagnetic fields of industrial frequencies 
(50 Hz) hundreds of times higher than the average level of natural fields. The field 
strength under the transmission line can reach tens of thousands of V/M. The 
greatest field strength is observed at the place of maximum sagging of wires, at the 
point of projection of extreme wires on the ground and five meters from it around 
the longitudinal axis of the route: for 330 kV transmission line - 3.5 - 5.0 kV/m, for 
transmission line - 500 kV - 7.6 - 8 kV/m, for transmission line-750 kV - 10.0 - 
15.0 kV/m. 
 The negative effects of electromagnetic fields on humans or other 
components of ecosystems are directly proportional to the field strength and 
irradiation time. The adverse effect of the electromagnetic field generated by the 
transmission line is detected already at a field strength of 1000 V/m. In humans, the 
endocrine system, metabolic processes, functions of the brain and spinal cord, and 
others are disturbed. 
To date, according to environmentalists and hygienists, it is known that all 
ranges of electromagnetic radiation have an impact on human health and 
performance and have long-term consequences. The effect of electromagnetic 
fields on humans due to their high prevalence is more dangerous than radiation. 
Electric fields of industrial frequency surround a person around the clock, thanks to 
radiation from wiring, lighting, household electrical and electronic appliances, 
power lines, etc. The energy load from electromagnetic radiation in industry and in 
everyday life is constantly increasing due to the rapid expansion of the network of 
sources of physical fields of electromagnetic nature, as well as with an increase in 
their capacity. A person is not able to physically feel the surrounding 
electromagnetic field, but it causes a decrease in its adaptive reserves, reduced 
 
 
immunity, efficiency, under its influence a person develops chronic fatigue 
syndrome, increases the risk of disease. The effects of electromagnetic radiation on 
children, adolescents, pregnant women and people with impaired health are 
especially dangerous. 
5.1.1. Possible mechanisms of biological action of the electromagnetic 
field 
The mechanism of action of electromagnetic radiation on living organisms 
has not yet been definitively deciphered. There are several hypotheses that explain 
the biological effects of the electromagnetic field. They are mainly reduced to the 
induction of currents in tissues and the direct action of the field at the cellular level, 
primarily with its effect on membrane structures. It is assumed that under the action 
of the electromagnetic field can change the rate of diffusion through biological 
membranes, the orientation and conformation of biological macromolecules, in 
addition, the state of the electronic structure of free radicals. Apparently, the 
mechanisms of biological action of the electromagnetic field are mainly non-
specific and are associated with changes in the activity of regulatory systems of the 
body. 
 
5.1.2. Influence of electromagnetic field on a cell 
The target for initiating any adaptive effect, in the first place, are membranes, 
plasma and intracellular, limiting the various intracellular components. There is a 
high sensitivity of cell membranes to the action of various chemical and physical 
agents, in particular to radiation. Morphological and functional disorders of the 
membranes are detected almost immediately after irradiation and at very low doses. 
The change in the ionic composition that occurs in this case can initiate 
proliferative processes in the cell. In addition to changing the permeability of 
biological membranes and accelerating the active transport of sodium cations, 
under the influence of electromagnetic radiation is the activation of peroxidation of 




It is assumed that all these changes at the cellular level develop for the 
following reasons: 
The electromagnetic field affects charged particles and currents, as a result of 
which the field energy at the cell level will convert into other types of energy. 
Atoms and molecules in an electric field are polarized. Polar molecules are oriented 
in the direction of propagation of the magnetic field. In electrolytes, which are 
liquid components of tissues, ionic currents occur after the action of an external 
field. The alternating electric field causes the heating of the tissues of living 
organisms both due to the variable polarization of the dielectric (tendons, cartilage, 
bones) and due to the appearance of conduction currents. The thermal effect is a 
consequence of the absorption of electromagnetic field energy. The greater the field 
strength and duration of action, the more pronounced these effects. To the value of 
J=10 MW/m, conventionally taken as the thermal threshold, excess heat is removed 
due to the thermoregulatory mechanism. In addition, the sensitivity of organs to 
overheating is determined by their structure. The most sensitive to overheating are 
the organs of vision, brain, kidneys, gallbladder and bladder. 
 
5.1.3. Influence of electromagnetic field on the nervous system 
The first experimental studies on the effects of electromagnetic fields on the 
nervous system were conducted in the Soviet Union. In the monographs of 
Professor Y. Kholodov published the results of his many years of research on the 
effects of electromagnetic and magnetic fields on the central nervous system. The 
presence of a direct action of the electromagnetic field on the brain, neuronal 
membrane, memory, conditioned reflex activity was established. Model 
experiments show the possibility of the influence of weak electromagnetic fields on 
the synthesis processes in nerve cells. There are clear changes in the impulses of 
cortical neurons, leading to a violation of the transmitted information in the more 
complex structures of the brain. R. Krutikov discovered that under the action of an 
electromagnetic field in the ultrahigh frequency range, short-term memory 




5.1.4. The effect of electromagnetic radiation on the immune system 
Currently, sufficient data have been accumulated to indicate that the 
processes of immunogenesis are disrupted by the action of the electromagnetic 
field. It is established that under the influence of an electromagnetic field the 
character of infectious process changes, there are disturbances of a protein 
metabolism, decrease in the content of albumins and increase in gamma globulins 
in blood is observed. In addition, the electromagnetic field can act as an allergen or 
a trigger, causing severe reactions in patients with allergies in contact with the 
electromagnetic field. 
 
5.1.5. Influence of weak electromagnetic fields on living organisms 
Weak electromagnetic fields at an intensity less than the threshold of the 
thermal effect also affect changes in living tissue. Research on the biological 
effects of cell phones, computer units and other electronic devices has been 
conducted in a number of Russian research centers, including the Faculty of 
Biology of Moscow State University. The harmfulness of electronic means was 
tested both in the working and off state of the device, including without power 
supplies. The results of studies evaluating the effect of cell phones, computers and 
other modern electronic devices on various organisms, both in working and off 
state, were disappointing and showed their extremely negative impact on the state 
of biological objects, which was: 
- in reducing the motor activity of microorganisms; 
- in increasing the mortality of microorganisms; 
- in the deterioration of tissue regeneration; 
- in violation of embryonic and larval development; 
- in the reduction of biochemical reactions, metabolic disorders; 
- in reducing the energy potential of all vital 
body systems. 
 
5.2. Calculation of electricity consumption 
 
 
The calculation of electricity consumption is determined depending on the 
power of the device (projected and base), the number of operating hours, taking 
into account the load factor, network losses and efficiency, and is carried out 
according to the formula: 
∑    
 
    
∑           
   
                       (5.1) 
where Муі is total power of the designed and equipment (0.15kW) without 
backup equipment; 
Faf is actual fund of time and equipment (5000); 
Kle is load factor and equipment (0.90); 
Ku is update factor (0.85);  
η is the efficiency (0.85);  
Кl is loss factor in networks (0.95). 
∑   
 
   
 
                   
         
          
Depending on the task, it is possible to determine the consumption of 
electricity for lighting the i-th production site by the formula: 
∑    
 
    
∑         
    
                                   (5.2) 
where Ру is the specific consumption of electricity per 1 м
2
 (0.01 kW); 
Fyi - the area of the i-th section;  
Flі - the number of hours of lighting fixtures in 3-shift operation of the i-th 
shop (3100 hours); 
 K - loss ratio: (K = 1,05). 
∑   
 
   
 
                  
    
        
The total electricity consumption is determined by the formula: 
  ∑    
 
    ∑    
 
                             (5.3) 
Environmental damage caused to the environment is determined by the 
formula: 
yеl = W уеl,                                                     (5.4) 
 
 
where yеl is specific environmental damage 24.36cents/kWh. 
∑    
 
                                 UAH. 
As a result of the development, the possibility of erroneous measurements 
must be eliminated and thus air pollution as a result of emissions of harmful 
substances must be eliminated. 
Initial data: total power of electrical equipment (without backup) - 0.15kW; 
The total ecological and economic damage caused to the natural environment 
during the project implementation is determined by the formula: 
    ∑    
 
                                                 (5.5) 
where ∑    
 
    - the total damage caused to the natural environment from 
electricity consumption. 
Thus, the total environmental and economic effect obtained as a result of the 
project will be yn = 194.25UAH. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
This section discusses the effects of electromagnetic radiation on the human 
body, namely the effects of computers and other computer equipment. Also, the 
ecological and economic effect and some recommendations for further 
modernization, additional factors influencing the environment and measures to 
eliminate them: 
1. Ecological and economic effect is approximately 194.25UAH per year (for 
the enterprise). 
2. At the further modernization of development it is necessary to consider 
norms and norms of ecological safety. 
3. When working with an electronic analyzer, it is necessary to take into 
account the effect of electromagnetic radiation on humans, as well as ergonomic 
features of work. 
4. It is necessary to develop measures to ensure the neutralization of negative 
effects, or if possible, reduce the damage to the environment, namely: 
- use of "clean" electricity - obtained from alternative sources; 
 
 
- introduction of new technologies with a lower level of electromagnetic 
radiation and energy consumption, and with better technical characteristics; 
- the use of waste-free technologies, which, although they do not completely 











The main role in aviation is to increase the safety of transportation. This can 
be achieved by analyzing current research methods and application in real practice. 
In psychology, such a science as the human factor is excellent. It reveals the full 
depth of pilot errors and the possible causes of their occurrence. By researching this 
science, you can understand how the human brain works in different conditions, 
ranging from changes in the weather to emotional burnout. Considered many 
different errors that can lead to a not very good situation.  
The concept of loss of control is discussed, why it occurs, how to keep the 
steering wheel in such conditions. A delicate moment occurs when the plane pours 
into a stall. Then it remains a matter of minutes to align it. This is not easy. You 
need to skillfully and quickly approach the solution of this problem. Also 
considered is such a concept as divergence in perception. It is at such a moment 
that the pilot needs to pay attention not only to personal perceptions, but also to 
instrument instruments. 
Various light and signal sensors help to understand what is happening and 
make decisions. They are working under an aid. 
 
 
The only current method of working to improve the quality of piloting is 
more practice. As for piloting in critical, abnormal or dangerous situations, it is 
better to practice different situations on the simulator. Indeed, in flight, it is 
dangerous to turn off the engine like this just to understand how to proceed. 
Moreover, when it comes to the responsibility of hundreds of passengers. 
This paper proposes a technique for improving the actions of the crew in 
cases when the avionics systems give out any failures or malfunctions. First of all, 
it is necessary to conduct a deep analysis of the previous actions of the crew 
members, to find out the technical problems, to analyze the data from the flight 
recorders, to follow the development of the aviation industry entirely. 
Also, in the thesis, the flight data and schedules of the An-148 and An-26 
aircraft were analyzed. 
Calculations have been made and a histogram has been constructed 
according to the distribution law of the flight by the pilot's roll after the third turn. 
It is proposed to implement this analysis in the training system. 
I think that this method can be applied in an airline environment, constantly 
improving the skills of the crew members. They will become more trained, and 
therefore more prepared for different situations. This will lead to much more 
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